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Summary Table 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure -0.8 -0.3 2.0 3.6 3.4 
Public Net Current Expenditure -2.2 1.4 4.6 1.3 1.0 
Investment 8.6 -6.6 14.3 27.2 19.2 
Exports 2.1 2.5 12.1 13.1 7.6 
Imports 2.9 0.0 14.7 15.7 10.1 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 0.2 1.4 5.2 6.7 4.8 
Gross National Product (GNP) 1.6 4.6 6.9 5.2 5.3 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
    
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1.7 0.5 0.2 -0.1 1.0 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 0.2 -0.4 1.7 2.0 2.3 
      
       
Labour Market      
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,842 1,880 1,914 1,967 2,018 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 316 282 243 200 173 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 14.7 13.0 11.3 9.3 7.9 
      
       
Public Finance      
General Government Balance (€ bn) -14.1 -10.2 -7.3 -2.3 -1.2 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -8.0 -5.7 -3.9 -1.1 -0.5 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 120.2 120.0 107.5 94.9 86.7 
      
       
External Trade      
Balance of Payments Current Account (€ bn) -2.7 5.6 6.8 11.6 14.5 
Current Account (% of GNP) -1.5 3.1 3.6 5.4 6.2 
      
      
Demand      
Final Demand 1.5 0.9 9.4 11.1 7.5 
Domestic Demand 0.7 -1.2 5.7 8.4 7.4 
Domestic Demand (excl. Stocks) 1.0 -1.5 5.2 8.8 7.4 
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National Accounts 2014 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 85.7 89.0 3.8 1.7 2.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 26.1 27.2 4.3 -0.2 4.6 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 31.7 36.5 15.3 0.8 14.3 
Exports of Goods and Services 191.4 215.0 12.3 0.2 12.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.8 1.9    
Final Demand 335.7 369.6 10.1 0.7 9.4 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services 156.8 180.3 15.0 0.3 14.7 
Statistical Discrepancy 0.5 -0.2    
GDP at Market Prices 179.4 189.0 5.3 0.1 5.2 
Net Factor Payments -27.4 -26.2    
GNP at Market Prices 152.0 162.9 7.1 0.2 6.9 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.2 3.4 0.2 6.4 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 67.7 70.0 2.4 3.5 
Other 64.0 68.4 4.4 6.9 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.6 -0.3   
Statistical Discrepancy -0.5 0.2   
Net Domestic Product 135.0 141.9 6.8 5.0 
Net Factor Payments -27.4 -26.2 1.2 -4.5 
National Income 107.6 115.7 8.0 7.5 
Depreciation 28.4 29.3 0.9 3.3 
GNP at Factor Cost 136.0 145.0 9.0 6.6 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.0 17.9 1.9 11.6 
GNP at Market Prices 152.0 162.9 10.8 7.1 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 34.6 34.9 0.2 
F -27.4 -26.2 1.2 
Net Transfers -2.9 -2.7 0.2 
Balance on Current Account 4.3 6.0 1.6 
as % of GNP 2.8 3.7 1.0 
 
 
iv | Qua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  Comme nt ary  –  Wi nt e r  2 015  
 
National Accounts 2015 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 89.0 92.6 4.1 0.5 3.6 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27.2 28.2 3.4 2.0 1.3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 36.5 46.9 28.5 1.0 27.2 
Exports of Goods and Services 215.0 259.0 20.5 6.6 13.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.9 1.0 
   Final Demand 369.6 427.6 15.7 4.1 11.1 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services  180.3 214.4 18.9 2.8 15.7 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 -0.2    
GDP at Market Prices 189.3 213.2 12.6 5.5 6.7 
Net Factor Payments  -26.2 -30.5    
GNP at Market Prices 162.9 182.0 11.7 6.2 5.2 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.4 3.4 0.0 1.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 70.0 73.5 3.4 4.9 
Other 68.4 92.0 23.6 34.5 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3   
Statistical Discrepancy 0.2 0.2   
Net Domestic Product 141.9 168.9 27.1 19.1 
Net Factor Payments -26.2 -31.0 -4.8 18.5 
National Income 115.7 137.9 22.2 19.2 
Depreciation 29.3 25.0 -4.3 -14.7 
GNP at Factor Cost 145.0 162.9 17.9 12.3 
Taxes less Subsidies 17.9 19.1 1.2 6.7 
GNP at Market Prices 162.9 182.0 19.1 11.7 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 34.9 44.5 9.7 
F -26.2 -31.0 -4.8 
Net Transfers -2.7 -2.7 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 6.0 10.8 4.8 
as % of GNP 3.7 5.9 2.7 
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National Accounts 2016 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 92.6 96.7 4.4 1.0 3.4 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28.2 28.9 2.8 1.8 1.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 46.9 57.4 22.3 2.6 19.2 
Exports of Goods and Services 259.0 290.9 12.3 4.4 7.6 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.0 1.0 
   Final Demand 427.6 474.9 11.1 3.3 7.5 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services  214.4 242.4 13.0 2.7 10.1 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 -0.2    
GDP at Market Prices 213.2 232.5 9.1 4.0 4.8 
Net Factor Payments  -31.0 -32.0    
GNP at Market Prices 182.0 200.3 10.1 4.5 5.3 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.4 3.5 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 73.5 77.1 3.7 5.0 
Other 92.0 104.7 12.7 13.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3 
  Statistical Discrepancy 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Net Domestic Product 168.9 185.3 16.4 9.7 
Net Factor Payments -31.0 -32.0 -1.0 3.2 
National Income 137.9 153.3 15.4 11.2 
Depreciation 25.0 26.5 1.5 6.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 162.9 179.8 16.9 10.4 
Taxes less Subsidies 19.1 20.4 1.4 7.3 
GNP at Market Prices 182.0 200.3 18.3 10.1 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 44.5 48.5 3.9 
F -31.0 -32.0 -1.0 
Net Transfers -2.7 -2.7 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 10.8 13.7 2.9 
as % of GNP 5.9 6.9 1.5 
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The Irish Economy - Forecast Overview and Summary 
 
The Irish economy is set to register a substantial growth performance in 2015 
with the expected 6.7 per cent year-on-year increase in output unsurpassed since 
2005. While the Irish recovery has benefitted from a weak Euro and strong 
economic performance amongst key trading partners, it is noteworthy, 
particularly given a variety of countervailing factors; the ongoing difficulties in the 
Irish financial sector, the related low levels of credit extended, the persistent high 
levels of private sector debt and the anaemic performance of many European 
economies since 2010. 
 
The Nowcasting model (summarised in the Appendix) indicates that the economy 
grew by 6.8 per cent during 2015 with the highest rates of growth occurring in Q2 
and Q3. Based on the strong performance through the year, we also revise 
upwards our outlook for 2016 with an expected output growth rate now of 4.8 
per cent. 
 
While investment began to contribute to the Irish recovery in 2014, private 
consumption saw a significant increase in 2015 with expenditure on items such as 
motor cars, retail sales and household goods registering the largest year-on-year 
growth. This increase in expenditure occurred as the overall burden of household 
debt in the Irish economy fell back to 2006 levels. Notwithstanding this increase, 
the level of consumption in real terms in 2015 is still set to be less than that 
which prevailed in 2008. 
 
External trade is likely to continue as a significant source of growth in 2016, 
however we note a number of potential downside risks in that regard. The OECD, 
amongst others, is concerned about the performance of key emerging economies 
in 2016, while any unwinding of the ongoing vulnerabilities in the Chinese 
economy could have serious implications for key Irish trading partners such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Europe. Next year may also see a 
referendum in the UK on its membership of the European Union. The recent 
report by the ESRI,1 which teases out some of the likely implications of a British 
withdrawal, illustrates the negative trade implications for the Irish economy of 
such a development.  
 
 
                                                          
1  Barret, A., A. Bergin, J. FitzGerald, D. Lambert, D. McCoy, E. Morgenroth, I. Siedschlag and Z. Studnika (2015). Scoping 
the Possible Economic Implications of Brexit on Ireland. ESRI, available at www.esri.ie. 
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In the Autumn Commentary we outlined our view that a neutral budgetary 
strategy was the optimal policy to follow, especially given the strong growth rates 
evident in the economy. This was framed against the official position announced 
in the Stability Programme Update (SPU) in May that there would be a €1.5 billion 
stimulatory package split evenly between expenditure and taxation. However, it 
was particularly disappointing that the degree of the expansionary package was 
compounded by the greater than expected current Government expenditure in 
2015 announced just prior to the budget. This suggests that the Government is 
putting almost €2.8 billion into the Irish economy at a time of already significant 
growth.  
 
In light of the remarkable growth rates for 2014 and 2015, in the domestic 
section of the Commentary, we tease out the actual output levels vis-à-vis 
potential in the Irish economy at present. While unemployment at 9 per cent 
would suggest that there is still a large degree of spare capacity, current rates of 
productivity (both total factor and labour) are particularly high. Were these rates 
to converge back to long-run trends, as is likely, particularly as greater factor 
inputs are employed in the economy, then the degree of spare capacity would 
not be as large as previously thought. Consequently, in 2015, we believe a 
negative output gap of 1 per cent exists.  
 
Finally, as with a number of recent Commentaries, we devote some attention to 
the housing market. Recent research2 suggests that it may take up to three years 
for supply in the Irish market to reach the underlying structural demand of 
approximately 25,000 units per annum. However, it is also clear that the targets 
for social housing set out in Social Housing 2020 (2014)3 for the period 2015-2018 
are also unlikely to be met. One possible way of achieving a significant increase in 
social housing provision is for the State to provide this through local authority 
schemes as it used to prior to 2009. 
 
 
                                                          
2  Duffy D., D. Foley and K. McQuinn (2015). ‘Cross-country residential investment rates and the implications for supply 
response in Ireland’, Paper to the joint EU Commission / ESRI Seminar: Housing Ireland’s Recovery: Policy 
perspectives, Dublin, November.  
3  Social housing 2020 (2014). ‘Support, supply and reform’, Department of Environment, Community and Local 
Government, available at www.environ.ie/en/PublicationsDocuments/FileDownLoad,39622,en.pdf. 
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The International Economy 
 
The economic performance of Ireland’s main trading partners remains positive 
with GDP in each of the UK, US and Euro Area increasing in the final quarters of 
2015. Significant downside risks remain, particularly those associated with a 
downturn in the Chinese economy, which threaten future growth prospects for 
many developed economies. Figure 1 shows forecast GDP growth in Ireland’s 
three main trading partners. Since the Spring Commentary growth forecasts for 
the Euro Area for 2015 have been revised upwards from 1.3 per cent to 1.5 per 
cent. Real GDP in 2016 is forecast to grow by 1.7 per cent, relatively unchanged 
from the beginning of the year. While the 2015 and 2016 growth forecasts for the 
UK remain unchanged, growth forecasts for the US have been revised downwards 
since the Autumn Commentary. The US is now forecast to grow by 2.2 per cent in 
2015 and 2.6 per cent in 2016, while the UK is forecast to grow by 2.4 per cent in 
each year. 
 
FIGURE 1 Real GDP Growth (% change, year-on-year) 
               Euro Area               United States               United Kingdom 
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
The Euro Area Economy 
Compared with the second quarter of 2015, seasonally-adjusted GDP rose by 0.3 
per cent in the Euro Area and by 0.4 per cent in the European Union during the 
third quarter of the year. When compared to the same period of 2014, 
seasonally-adjusted GDP rose by 1.6 per cent in the Euro Area and by 1.9 per cent 
in the European Union. Among the Member States for which data are available, 
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Estonia, Greece and Finland recorded negative growth in Q3 2015 while Romania, 
Slovakia and Poland recorded the highest growth rates.  
 
Euro Area annual inflation was 0.1 per cent in October 2015, up from -0.1 per 
cent in the previous month and compares with a rate of 0.4 per cent for the same 
period last year. The latest figures from Eurostat also indicate that annual 
inflation in the European Union was 0 per cent in October 2015 compared to a 
rate of 0.5 per cent 12 months previous. When compared to the rates recorded in 
September 2015, annual inflation fell in four Member States, remained stable in 
seven and rose in 16. However, when energy prices – believed to be the main 
driver of falling inflation – are excluded, annual inflation was 1.2 per cent in 
October 2015. As noted in previous Commentaries, despite its drag on annual 
inflation, lower oil prices should continue to support consumption growth 
through the positive impact on household personal disposable income.  
 
In September 2015 the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate in the Euro Area 
was 10.8 per cent, down from 11.5 per cent in the same period last year. This is 
the lowest rate recorded in the Euro Area since January 2012 and compares to 
the 7.5 per cent recorded on the eve of the financial crisis in 2007. Among the 
Member States large differences remain in the level of unemployment. For 
example, the lowest unemployment rate for 2015, 4.5 per cent, was recorded in 
Germany in September. While the largest decrease in unemployment in the 12 
months to September 2015 was registered in Spain – a fall of some 2.4 per cent – 
its unemployment rate remains amongst the highest recorded in the Euro Area at 
21.6 per cent.  
 
In response to persistent low inflation in the Euro Area, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) decided in the December governing council meeting to cut its deposit 
facility to -0.3 per cent from -0.2 per cent. The main refinancing rate remains 
unchanged at 0.05 per cent. In advance of the December governing council 
meeting, Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, indicated that all instruments 
available within their mandate would be used if it is concluded that the balance 
of risks to the medium-term price stability objectives are skewed to the 
downside. In addition, chief economist Peter Praet also cited mounting risks that 
inflation will remain below the ECB target of just below 2 per cent for longer than 
previously anticipated. In addition, the monthly asset purchases of €60 billion, as 
part of the non-standard monetary policy measures, have been extended to run 
until September 2017 or beyond if necessary. 
 
In November, Vice-President of the ECB, Vítor Constâncio commented on the 
deterioration of the Euro Area’s external environment since the introduction of 
the asset purchasing programme earlier this year. In particular, he raised 
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concerns about growth prospects in emerging markets and unfavourable 
developments in financial and commodity markets, all of which signal downside 
risks to the outlook for growth and inflation. While he echoed Mario Draghi’s 
sentiment that monetary policy has been and will continue to be accommodative, 
he also highlighted the fact that without a common European fiscal policy, 
monetary policy alone cannot respond to all the existing challenges. 
 
A recent report from the Association of European Conjuncture Institutes (AIECE)4 
indicated that the Euro Area’s fiscal position has significantly improved since the 
difficulties of 2009. However, attention is drawn to the evolution of public debt 
levels, with consideration given to the growing heterogeneity in the fiscal 
positions of different countries. Compared to the situation in 2007 when the 
standard deviation of debt-to-GDP ratios across Euro Area countries was 29.7, 
current estimates suggest this had reached 40.3 in 2014. For example, public debt 
in Germany is expected to fall below the 70 percent of GDP threshold in 2016, 
while the rate in France is expected to exceed 100 percent of GDP. 
 
While the weak Euro and low oil prices continue to support growth, downside 
risks from within the Euro Area continue to exist. Following difficult negotiations 
at the end of November, Greece succeeded in securing a deal with the Eurozone 
to unlock the latest tranche of financial aid. Although the fiscal situation in 
Greece remains problematic any spillover risk is nevertheless considered to be 
contained. The slowdown in China is also creating much uncertainty which is 
discussed in greater detail in The World Economy subsection. 
 
The US Economy 
Real GDP increased at an annual rate of 2.1 per cent in the third quarter of 2015 
according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the second quarter, real GDP 
increased by 3.9 per cent. The increase in real GDP in the third quarter (compared 
to an initial estimate of 1.5 per cent) primarily reflects upward revisions to 
business spending on equipment. Consumer spending also remains strong 
despite slight downward revisions this month. Growth in exports was also revised 
down in the third quarter reflecting a persistently strong Dollar and sluggish 
global demand.  
 
Following the decision by the Federal Open Market Committee in October to 
leave interest rates unchanged, it is anticipated that strong figures recorded in 
the third quarter of the year will result in the first rate hike in nine years in mid-
December. Since December 2008 the Federal Reserve has kept its benchmark 
 
                                                          
4  AIECE (2015). General Report. Coe-Rexecode, Brussels, November 5-6. 
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interest rate at a range between zero and one-quarter per cent. However, with 
the unemployment rate now at 5 per cent – what the Federal Reserve regards as 
‘full employment’ – speculation has heightened that interest rates will be 
increased in December.  
 
The unemployment rate is now at its lowest level since April 2008. Over the past 
12 months, the unemployment rate and the number of unemployed persons 
were down by 0.7 percentage points and 1.1 million, respectively. The labour 
force participation rate was unchanged at a new 32-year low of 62.4 per cent in 
October, following a decline of 0.2 percentage points in September. The 
employment-population ratio, at 59.3 per cent, changed little in October and has 
hardly moved over the past year. 
 
The UK Economy 
The most recent data from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) indicate that UK 
GDP increased by 0.5 per cent in the third quarter of 2015. This compares to 
growth of 0.7 per cent reported in the second quarter of the year. As a result of 
these growth rates, GDP is 2.3 per cent higher in Q3 2015 compared to the same 
quarter one year ago. The apparent easing of austerity measures in the recent 
half-year budget update should go some way to reinforcing the positive growth 
outlook for 2016.  
 
Despite the relative strength of the recovery and continued reduction in the 
unemployment rate, price pressure in the UK economy remains weak. The 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) fell by 0.1 per cent in the year to October 2015, the 
same fall as in the year to September 2015. Recent data from the ONS suggest 
that annual inflation has been at or around 0 per cent since February of this year. 
Much of the recent downward pressure on CPI inflation has reflected the fall in 
oil prices, the appreciation of Sterling and strong competition among retailers. 
Historically, price movements in these groups have been the main causes of 
inflation. 
 
There is still considerable uncertainty regarding when UK interest rates might 
increase. Despite the economy being described as robust and resilient, the Bank 
of England, in its recent quarterly inflation report, indicated that a weakening of 
their outlook for global growth forced them to reconsider when a rate change 
may occur. Following six and a half years of record low rates it is now anticipated 
that rates will not rise until the second quarter of 2016 at the very earliest. Even 
with limited and gradual rate increases, Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of 
England, stated that the UK is likely to remain in a prolonged low interest rate 
environment for some time. 
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The unemployment rate fell to 5.3 per cent in the third quarter of 2015. This 
compares to a rate of 5.6 per cent in Q2 and 6 per cent a year previous. The rate 
recorded in Q3 2015 is also the lowest unemployment rate in the UK since April 
2008. In the third quarter of the year the employment rate was at its highest 
since comparable records began in 1971, at 73.7 per cent. Despite the strong 
employment figures, pay inflation remains subdued. Excluding bonuses, regular 
earnings in the three months to September were 2.5 per cent higher than in the 
same three months of 2014. This is down from 2.8 per cent which was recorded 
for Q3 August 2015. Interest rate hikes are likely to remain unchanged while 
wage growth remains weak. 
 
A British exit from the European Union remains one of the most prevalent risks to 
the Irish economy. A recent study by the ESRI5 determined the potential 
economic consequences of a ‘Brexit’ for Ireland. Focusing on four key areas – 
trade, foreign direct investment, energy and migration – the evidence suggests 
that Ireland’s interests are best served by the UK remaining within the EU. 
Research6 from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) 
highlighted the difficulty with quantifying the impact on the UK of a withdrawal 
from the EU given the range of factors that need to be considered. While the 
research does not anticipate significant disruption to employment levels in the 
UK, the analysis does suggest that a withdrawal could mean that the level of 
output in the UK economy would be lowered permanently. Other research on the 
topic has drawn similar conclusions.7 
 
The World Economy 
Weakening growth and financial vulnerabilities in China continue to be the main 
sources of downside risk. Despite repeated interest rate cuts, amongst other 
stimulus measures, China’s economic growth slowed to a six-year low of 6.9 per 
cent in the third quarter of 2015. 
 
The ECB8 recently highlighted the main risk to the Euro Area of an economic 
slowdown in China; falling exports, capital outflows and exchange rate 
fluctuations. They maintain that an economic ‘confidence shock’ could lead to a 
tightening of financial conditions in emerging markets and a further slowdown of 
 
                                                          
5  Barret, A., A. Bergin, J. FitzGerald, D. Lambert, D. McCoy, E. Morgenroth, I. Siedschlag and Z. Studnika (2015). Scoping 
the Possible Economic Implications of Brexit on Ireland. ESRI, www.esri.ie. 
6  Pain, N. and G. Young (2004). ‘The macroeconomic impact of UK withdrawal from the EU’. Economic Modelling Vol. 
21(3), pp 387-408. National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London. 
7  Ottaviano, G., J.P. Pessoa, T. Sampson and J. Van Reenen (2014). Brexit or Fixit? The Trade and Welfare Effects of 
Leaving the European Union. The Centre of Economic Performance (CEP) 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/pa016.pdf. 
8  See www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eb201507_focus01.en.pdf. 
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Euro Area foreign demand. In particular, it is feared that the health of the Chinese 
stock market could impact markets in the Euro Area through the effects on global 
confidence. 
 
A recent paper from Buiter (2015)9 notes the reasons behind China’s downturn 
and likely recession. As with business cycles everywhere, rising excess capacity in 
a growing number of sectors, excessive leverage in the private sector as well as 
irrational exuberance in asset markets are cited as three of the main reasons. The 
paper concludes that while policy options exist they are unlikely to be 
implemented in time to prevent a recession. The OECD, amongst others, has 
noted the challenge for the Chinese economy is to rebalance activity towards 
consumption and services while maintaining GDP growth and financial stability.  
 
In seeking to quantify the potential impact of any global shock on the Irish 
economy it is useful to examine results in Bergin et al. (2013).10 The analysis 
examines a 1 percentage point increase in world output; however, the effects are 
symmetric and therefore we can also interpret the results from the point of view 
of a growth shock which reduces world output by 1 percentage point. If this were 
to occur, Irish GDP in the first year of the shock would fall by 0.8 per cent. In 
addition to this, exports of goods and services would also fall by 3.2 per cent in 
the same year as the shock. As in previous Commentaries, it is worth highlighting 
the fact that any downside risk associated with the Chinese downturn would 
affect Ireland primarily through secondary markets such as the US, UK and the 
Euro Area.  
 
Following a meeting of OPEC in early December, which resulted in no change 
made to the over-supply of oil, Brent crude oil prices fell a further 5 per cent to 
US$41. As recently as summer 2014, Brent stood at US$110 a barrel but in 16 
months its price has been more than halved in response to a slowdown in China 
and other emerging market economies. 
 
Implications for Irish Exports, Imports and the Balance of Payments 
The Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) figures for Q3 2015 show that seasonally 
adjusted, the total volume of imports are up 18 per cent over Q3 2014. This 
consisted of increases in both goods and services imports of 5 per cent and 28 per 
cent respectively. The strong growth in service imports, in part, reflects patent 
purchases. Seasonally-adjusted total exports also show strong growth with an 
 
                                                          
9  Buiter W. (2015). ‘Is China Leading the World into Recession?’ Global Economic View, Citibank. Available online at: 
http://willembuiter.com/China2015.pdf. 
10  Bergin A., T. Conefrey, J. Fitzgerald, I. Kearney and N. Znuderl (2013). ‘The HERMES-13 macroeconomic model of the 
Irish economy’, ESRI, Working Paper No. 460, July. 
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increase of 12 per cent. Goods exports increased by 16 per cent and services 
exports grew 8 per cent in the year to Q2 2015.  
 
The Balance of Payments release for Q3 2015 shows strong growth in both 
services imports and exports. Total services exports, as recorded by the Balance 
of Payments, increased 15 per cent in value from Q3 2014 to Q3 2015, primarily 
driven by an increase in computer services exports of 22 per cent. The figures 
also reveal an increase of service imports of 32 per cent. The main driver of this 
was an increase in royalties and licences. The figure for the current account 
surplus for Q3 2015 is €2.4 billion or 4.5 per cent of GDP. This compares to a 
surplus of €3.12 billion for Q3 2014. This figure is somewhat less than would have 
been the case under the previous treatment of aircraft leasing in the National 
Accounts. This figure can also be affected by redomiciled PLCs which tend to 
inflate the balance on the current account. 
 
FIGURE 2  Goods Exports and Imports  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Looking at more recent data, the monthly release of goods exports and imports 
by the CSO shows that seasonally-adjusted goods exports fell by 4.0 per cent 
from the August 2015 figure. The equivalent figure for goods imports fell by 3 per 
cent over the same period. The overall effect was to decrease the trade surplus 
by €252 million or 7 per cent in September. A noticeable downward trend has 
emerged in the trade statistics in recent months as is evident from Figure 2.  
 
The unadjusted value of goods exports increased by 5 per cent or €420 million in 
the year to September. Some of the components that experienced strong growth 
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compared to last year include medical and pharmaceutical products of 14 per 
cent or €278 million. Essential oils increased by 17 per cent or €88 million and 
electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances and parts increased by 24 per 
cent or €48 million. 
 
Overall the unadjusted value of goods imports decreased in September 2015 by 5 
per cent or €284 million when compared to September 2014. The decrease 
consisted of falls in imports of petroleum of 47 per cent or €245 million. Imports 
of other transport equipment (including aircraft) fell by 82 per cent or €642 
million. This particular component is highly volatile and so it is not too surprising 
to see movements of this scale from the series. There was also growth in some 
goods including organic chemicals of 86 per cent or €148 million and medical and 
pharmaceutical products of 37 per cent or €130 million. Once again it appears 
that goods imports and exports growth is dominated by a relatively small number 
of sectors and the volatility of these sectors increase the difficulty in forecasting 
these series.  
 
Figure 3 provides the share of goods imports and exports by country. The UK 
remains Ireland’s single biggest trading partner with approximately 28 per cent of 
imports and 14 per cent of exports. This reliance on the UK means there could 
potentially be significant implications if Britain leaves the EU (Brexit). A recent 
publication from the ESRI,11 discussed previously, indicated that if Brexit were to 
occur, the bilateral trade flows between Ireland and the UK could decrease by as 
much as 20 per cent. This would obviously have negative implications for 
Ireland’s economic growth. Our other main trading partner, the US, accounts for 
approximately 22 per cent of exports and 12 per cent of imports. Figure 4 
highlights the level of service exports and imports by geographical location. The 
graph shows that the majority of services exports are going to the European 
Union while the majority of services imports are coming from outside the 
European Union. 
 
 
                                                          
11  See Barrett A., A. Bergin, J. Fitzgerald, D. Lambert, D. McCoy, E. Morgenroth, I. Siedschlag and Z. Studnicka (2015). 
Scoping the Possible Economic Implications of Brexit on Ireland, ESRI Research Series. 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  W i nt er  201 5 | 11 
 
FIGURE 3  Goods Exports and Imports by Destination 
  
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
As well as the potential threat of Brexit, the situation in China, as mentioned in 
the World Economy subsection, also provides a source of uncertainty for Ireland. 
Although Ireland’s share of goods exports to China is relatively small at 2 per cent 
and so the direct impact on exports would be limited, a slowdown in China 
leading to a drag on growth in our major trading partners could negatively impact 
Ireland’s growth. 
 
FIGURE 4 Services Exports and Imports by Geographical Detail (Q3 2015, € million)12 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
 
                                                          
12  Data for services exports and imports are only available for EMU18, EU28 and All Countries. 
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Central to Ireland’s recent strong export performance has been the improvement 
in the economy’s competitiveness and the robust growth of our main trading 
partners. The depreciation of the Euro against the US Dollar and the UK Pound as 
a result of the ECB’s accommodative monetary policy and lower unit labour costs 
have both led to a significant improvement in Ireland’s international 
competitiveness which boosts export growth. If we compare Ireland’s nominal 
effective exchange rate with countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain as in 
Figure 5, it becomes clear why Ireland’s exports have grown so robustly. Ireland’s 
nominal effective exchange rate since 2014 has depreciated to a significantly 
greater extent than these countries which also experienced large recessions. This 
pattern is also observed in the real effective exchange rate when inflation is taken 
into account. 
 
FIGURE 5  Nominal Effective Exchange Rate Index = 2010  
 
Source:  Bank of International Settlements. 
 
As well as a fall in the effective exchange rate, Ireland has regained its export 
market share, driven in part by increased cost competitiveness. Figure 6 shows 
relative unit labour costs (labour costs adjusted for productivity and compared 
with Ireland’s trading partners).13 It is clear that a reduction in unit labour costs 
has also been helpful in improving Ireland’s export performance in recent years. 
It is important to note that some of the fall has been a result of compositional 
effects, i.e. a move away from the labour intensive construction sector.14  
 
                                                          
13  OECD Economic Surveys: Ireland 2015. 
14  O’Farrell, R. (2015). ‘Wages and Ireland’s International Competitiveness’. The Economic and Social Review, 46(3), 
pp.429-458. 
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FIGURE 6  Relative Unit Labour Costs and Export Market Performance  
 
 
Source:  OECD economic outlook database. 
 
Taking these factors into account, we forecast exports to remain relatively robust 
in 2015, growing by 13.1 per cent before returning to more moderate levels of 
7.6 per cent in 2016. Given the strong economic performance domestically, the 
increase in consumers’ disposable income and the associated pickup in domestic 
consumption, we forecast imports to grow by 15.7 per cent in 2015 and 10.1 per 
cent in 2016. 
 
70.0
75.0
80.0
85.0
90.0
95.0
100.0
105.0
110.0
115.0
120.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
relative unit labour costs export market performance
14 | Qua rt er ly  Econom ic  Comme nt ary  –  Wi nt e r  2 015  
 
 
The Domestic Economy 
 
Output 
The domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors. Prices and earnings in the economy are then 
discussed, followed by a review of demand-side factors such as consumption and 
housing market issues. On the supply side, we then examine developments in 
investment and the labour market before concluding with an analysis of the 
public finances. 
 
The Irish economy is set to grow by a significant 6.7 per cent in 2015. This 
constitutes a remarkable recovery given the scale of difficulties which have 
afflicted the domestic economy over the past six or seven years and it is also the 
largest rate of growth experienced by the Irish economy since 2005.  
 
The growth performance in the current year has changed somewhat in 
composition, in that the initial wave of the recovery, which had been export 
driven in nature, is now increasingly being complemented by strong increases in 
both investment and consumption. In the initial Commentary of 2015 we had 
suggested that consumption would become an increasingly relevant source of 
growth in 2015 and this has now clearly transpired, indicating that while 
hangovers from the financial crisis are still prescient in the Irish economy they are 
no longer restricting growth. 
 
The Nowcasting model (summarised in the Appendix) indicates that the Irish 
economy grew by nearly 1.4 per cent for Q4 2015 following an increase of 1.7 per 
cent in Q3 2015. Based on these improving trends, we have revised upwards our 
growth forecast for 2015; we now envisage 2015 output growth in GDP of 6.7 per 
cent. We also revise upwards our outlook for 2016 with output growth of 4.8 per 
cent now expected. 
 
Potential Output and the Output Gap 
Given the particularly strong growth recovery now evident in the Irish economy it 
is timely to ascertain what the implications are for potential output. This concept 
is of increasing importance as the associated output gap is at the core of many of 
the metrics used in assessing the sustainability of the public finances. In order to 
address this question, we use the following growth accounting model outlined in 
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Byrne and McQuinn (2014)15 and McQuinn and Whelan (2008)16 where the 
following production system is assumed to capture the underlying dynamics of 
the Irish economy: 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐿𝑡1−𝛼 
𝐾𝑡 = (1− 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡−1 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡𝑌𝑡 
𝐿𝑡 = (1− 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑡) ∗ 𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡 
∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝑡 = 𝑙𝑡 
 
where 𝑌𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, 𝐼𝑡, and 𝐿𝑡 are output, capital, investment and employment 
respectively. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡 is population levels and 𝑃𝑡 is the labour force participation 
rate. Many studies have highlighted the difficulty in interpreting productivity 
estimates for the Irish economy mainly due to the significant presence of the 
multinational sector (see Honohan and Walsh, 200217 for example). Therefore we 
use GNP as the relevant output series for the empirical exercise.18  
 
In generating estimates of potential output, steady-state assumptions for the 
following key parameters are required; the investment rate 𝑠𝑡, the growth rate of 
total factor productivity (TFP) 𝑙𝑡 and the unemployment rate 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑡.  
 
As noted by Byrne and McQuinn (2014) a historical review of the Irish labour 
market would suggest that the long-run or median unemployment rate is 
approximately 6.5 per cent. At present, given that the actual unemployment rate 
in the economy is over 9 per cent, this suggests the existence of a significant, 
negative output gap in the Irish case meaning that a considerable amount of 
spare capacity exists in the domestic economy. Indeed if we simulate the system 
above taking both the investment rate and the rate of TFP growth as being at 
their current rates, then the output gap at the end of 2015 is approximately 
minus 2.6 per cent.  
 
However, such an assumption in the case of TFP growth is somewhat 
problematic. Consider the graph of Irish productivity rates below along with the 
 
                                                          
15  Byrne D. and K. McQuinn (2014). ‘Irish Economic Performance 1987-2013: A Growth Accounting Assessment.’, QEC 
Research Note, Winter. 
16  McQuinn K. and K. Whelan (2008). ‘Prospects for growth in the Euro Area’, CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 54(4), 
pp.642-680, 2008. 
17  Honohan P. and B. Walsh (2002). ‘Catching up with the leaders: the Irish hare’, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, No. 1, pp.1-57.  
18  Note in calculating potential output estimates, we use data up to 2016 where the data for 2015 and 2016 are the 
latest QEC forecasts.  
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filtered value.19 The filtered value is typically taken to represent the long-run or 
steady-state trend for the variable in question. The filtered estimate suggests that 
in 2015 the long-run estimate of Irish TFP growth is approximately 1.6 per cent. 
 
As noted by McQuinn and Whelan (2015)20 most European economies and 
indeed the United States have experienced a consistent decline in both labour 
and total factor productivity rates since the 1990s. The Irish economy also 
appears to have registered a relatively stagnant rate of productivity growth over 
the same period. However since 2010, a clear increase in TFP is apparent. The 
crucial issue, therefore, in assessing potential output growth, is whether this 
recent increase in productivity should be treated as a temporary issue or more 
reflective of an underlying structural improvement in productivity in the Irish 
economy. For a number of reasons we believe a more accurate approximation of 
the underlying rate of TFP growth in Irish economy at the present time is given by 
its filtered rate of 1.6 per cent. This results in a (negative) output gap of -0.9 per 
cent.  
 
FIGURE 7 Actual and Filtered TFP Growth Rates (%) for the Irish Economy: 1990-2015 
 
 
Source:  QEC estimates. 
 
Given the significant fall-off in economic activity after 2007/2008, and the 
collapse in the housing market in particular,21 there has been some suggestion of 
an investment deficit in the Irish economy at present. This would suggest that the 
 
                                                          
19  The filtered value is given by a Hodrick-Prescott filter with lambda, the smoothing parameter = 100. 
20  McQuinn K. and K. Whelan (2015). ‘Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms’, 
ESRI Working Paper No. 501, May. 
21  See the Autumn Commentary 2015 for a comparison of Irish residential investment rates with other leading European 
countries.  
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investment rate is currently somewhat below its long-run rate. In Figure 8 we plot 
both the investment rate and its filtered estimate over the long run (from 1961 to 
2015), where investment is taken as a percentage of GNP.  
 
From the graph it can be seen that the actual and filtered investment rate in 2015 
are almost identical, reflecting the steep recovery in investment over the last 
couple of years. Over the period 1960-2015 the median investment rate is 23 per 
cent with the actual 2015 estimate 23.8 per cent. Therefore, whilst there are 
shortages in certain types of investment in the domestic economy, overall, the 
present investment rate would appear to be in line with its long-run steady state 
rate.  
 
FIGURE 8 Actual and Filtered Investment Rate for the Irish Economy: 1961-2015 
 
 
Source:  QEC data and estimates. 
 
Monetary and Financial Conditions 
The most recent financial statistics release from the Central Bank reveals a 
modest improvement in household circumstances. Figure 9 shows both the total 
level of household debt in the economy and the ratio of debt to income. It is clear 
that there has been a continuing decline in the level of debt since its peak in 
2008. The current level marks the lowest level reached since Q1 2006. Although 
this is a positive development it is worth noting that this is still relatively high 
compared to other countries. In fact, in the EU, only Denmark and Holland have 
higher debt-to-income ratios. 
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Household net worth22 rose to reach €600.1 billion or €129,454 per capita during 
Q2 2015. This represents growth of 0.6 per cent over the previous quarter. This is 
largely due to increases in housing asset values as well as declines in household 
liabilities. Overall household net worth has increased by 36 per cent since its 
lowest level of €441.2 billion in Q2 2012. 
 
Household debt continued to decline in Q2 2015, falling to €153.2 billion or 
€33,056 per capita. Overall the level of debt has decreased by 24.8 per cent since 
its peak of €203.7 billion at Q3 2008, which leads to a significant improvement in 
household debt sustainability in Q2 2015. More specifically the ratio of debt to 
disposable income fell by 4.3 percentage points during the quarter. 
 
FIGURE 9 Irish Household Debt 2003-2015 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
The number of mortgage accounts in arrears of over 90 days increased 
significantly in recent years, from 3.3 per cent of all outstanding mortgages on 
principal dwelling (PDH) properties at the end of Q3 2009 to a peak of 12.9 per 
cent by the end of Q3 2013. Figure 10 shows the number of mortgages in arrears 
over 90 days and 180 days as a percentage of outstanding PDH mortgages.  
 
There is now a clear downward trend emerging as the number of accounts in 
arrears over 90 days continues to decline in Q3 2015. The number of accounts in 
arrears over 90 days at the end of June was 65,584 or 8.7 per cent of outstanding 
 
                                                          
22  Household net worth is calculated as the sum of household housing and financial assets minus their liabilities. The 
Central Bank of Ireland estimate of housing assets is based on the size and value of housing stock. Data on the value 
of housing are obtained from the CSO’s ‘Residential Property Price Index’ (RPPI).  
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PDH mortgages. This represents a quarterly fall of 6.7 per cent and is the seventh 
consecutive quarter of decline. As noted in the Labour Market section, the 
decline in the unemployment rate and the improvement generally in labour 
market conditions are likely to be the main reasons for the improvement in the 
arrears rate.23 However, the number of arrears over 180 days has remained 
relatively stable at around 8.5 per cent over the past four years. The total number 
of buy-to-let (BTL) mortgages in arrears of 90 days and over at the end of Q2 
2015 was 19 per cent; this represented a marginal decline from the peak of 22 
per cent registered in Q3 2014. 
 
FIGURE 10 Select Mortgage Arrears Rates (%): Q3 2009-Q2 2015 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
Most recent Central Bank data show that the growth rate of credit extended to 
households remains negative. This change in credit levels has remained negative 
since late 2008 and reflects the significant deleveraging being undertaken by Irish 
households in the aftermath of the credit boom and subsequent bust. From 
Figure 11 we can see a precipitous decline in lending for consumption purposes 
from 2008 onward. Although households continue to pay down their debt levels, 
in the last year the rate of decline has decreased significantly. Clearly the changes 
within this figure signify that some households are borrowing to fund the 
increased consumption observed in 2015. This trend correlates with the pick-up 
in consumer sentiment reflected in the KBC/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index. As 
we expect consumption to continue to increase in 2016, it is highly likely that 
changes in credit for consumption purposes will register positive growth next 
year for the first time since early 2009.  
 
                                                          
23  See Mc Carthy, Y. (2014). ‘Disentangling the mortgage arrears crisis: The role of the labour market, income volatility 
and housing equity’ Research Technical Papers, 02/RT/14, Central Bank of Ireland. 
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FIGURE 11 Growth in Lending to Irish Households 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
It is interesting to observe that the cost of finance to households has drifted 
upwards since the start of 2015. In Figure 12 interest rates on overdraft facilities 
and consumer loans are plotted from 2013 onwards. With the exception of loans 
for greater than five years, all rates have steadily increased during the course of 
the present year. As noted in McQuinn and Morley (2015)24 in the case of 
mortgage interest rates, this occurs at a time when the ECB policy rate has been 
at a record low for some time. 
 
FIGURE 12  Interest Rates (%) on Loans to Irish Households 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
                                                          
24  McQuinn K. and C. Morley (2015). ‘Standard variable rate (SVR) pass-through in the Irish mortgage market: An 
updated assessment’, QEC Research Note, June. 
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Net lending to Irish non-financial corporations (NFCs) fell in September by 6.2 per 
cent. From Figure 13 it appears both longer- and short-term NFC lending has 
been declining since Q3 2013. This fall in longer-term credit is of some concern as 
it indicates a declining investment focus in the NFC sector. On the other hand, 
loans for medium-term durations (between one and five years), have recently 
showed strong positive growth, increasing by 12.9 per cent over September 2014.  
 
FIGURE 13 Year-on-Year Growth Rate (%) of Lending to Irish Resident Non-Financial Corporations:  
Q1 2007-Q2 2015 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
Given the importance of small and medium enterprises in Ireland,25 it is useful to 
look at recent trends in credit extended to them. Although deleveraging 
continues, there have been increases in year-over-year growth rates in credit 
extended to certain sectors. In particular, two of the largest percentage increases 
occurred in the information and communication sector while growth was also 
observed in other real estate activities. Credit extended to small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) is expected to improve and become more broad based as 
SMEs further pay down debt and as the current economic environment provides 
favourable conditions for banks to increase profitability and increase credit 
availability.  
 
In terms of funding of the sovereign, the overall picture in 2015 continues to 
improve. A total of €18 billion worth of loans was re-financed between Q4 2014 
and Q2 2015. It is estimated that the total interest cost savings could exceed €1.5 
billion over five years. In 2015, the NTMA issued its first ever 30-year bond which 
raised €4 billion; the yield on the bond was 2.088 per cent. The yield on the €1 
 
                                                          
25  See Lawless, M., C. O’Toole and D. Lambert (2014). Financing SMEs in Recovery: Evidence for Irish Policy Options, ESRI 
Research Series. 
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billion 2045 bond issued in March dropped to 1.31 per cent. Seven-year bonds 
were also sold in May with two 15-year bonds issued in September. As of 
November, €13 billion of sovereign funding has been issued so far this year, while 
the Exchequer had €15 billion of cash and other liquid assets at the end of 
September 2015. 
 
Prices and Earnings 
The monthly change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in November was -0.3 per 
cent. This compares to a growth rate of -0.2 per cent in October. The most 
significant factors that contributed to the decrease included a fall in transport 
prices of -1.6 per cent and a reduction in restaurants and hotels prices of -0.6 per 
cent. 
 
More importantly the latest CPI release from the CSO shows that annual growth 
in average prices is -0.2 per cent in November. This is the same as the growth rate 
observed in October. Given the strength of underlying economic activity, the 
deflation reflects the importance of external international factors such as falling 
energy prices. Figure 14 shows the annual growth rate in CPI with and without 
energy prices; excluding energy products results in an annual inflation rate of 0.8 
per cent, therefore the collapse in oil prices (Figure 15) earlier in the year is still 
exerting a significant drag on annual inflation. As a net importer of oil, the 
ongoing low price is acting as a significant stimulant to economic activity where 
businesses and consumers are the beneficiaries of lower than expected fuel 
costs. 
 
FIGURE 14  Inflation Rates Annual % Change 2012 M01-2015 M11  
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and European Central Bank. 
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Some of the notable annual changes in the components of the CPI include 
decreases in transport of -5.3 per cent, clothing and footwear of -3.6 per cent and 
food and non-alcoholic beverages of -1.3 per cent. There were also positive 
growth rates observed in components such as education of 3.8 per cent, 
miscellaneous goods and services of 2.3 per cent and restaurants and hotels of 
1.4 per cent. 
 
FIGURE 15 Oil Price US$ per Barrel   
 
 
Source:  Federal Reserve of St. Louis. 
 
A detailed breakdown of the percentage contribution to the annual fall in 
inflation reveals that transport, food and non-alcoholic beverages and clothing 
and footwear had the most significant effect, accounting for -0.71, -0.14 and 
-0.15 per cent respectively. It would appear that overall average prices in the 
service sector are growing with an increase of 2.4 per cent year-on-year while 
average prices for goods fell by 3.6 per cent. 
 
The Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), which allows for cross country 
comparisons of inflation within the EU, reveals that average annual prices are 
down 0.1 per cent from a year earlier. According to the HICP, some of the most 
notable changes in the year include increases in housing, water, electricity, gas 
and other fuels of 4.9 per cent, education of 3.8 per cent and restaurants and 
hotels of 1.4 per cent. Similar to the CPI, there were significant decreases in 
transport of 5.7 per cent and clothing and footwear of 3.4 per cent. 
 
Preliminary estimates for earnings growth in Q3 2015 suggest an annual increase 
in Average Hourly Earnings of 2.1 per cent, or from €21.02 to €21.46. This 
compares to an annual increase of 1.4 per cent for the previous quarter. The 
results suggest a broad-based increase with ten of the 13 sectors seeing growth 
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in Average Hourly Earnings. Of these, the largest increase was recorded in the 
administrative and support services sector, rising 10.6 per cent. The largest fall 
was recorded in the human health and social work sector, decreasing 0.7 per 
cent.  
 
Broadly similar earnings growth was observed in small, medium and large 
companies. In particular, annual Average Hourly Earnings in companies with less 
than 50 employees increased by 2.3 per cent while companies with employees 
between 50 and 250 grew by 2 per cent and companies with more than 250 
employees experienced the largest growth at 2.6 per cent.  
 
Earnings results by sector were mixed with private sector growth in annual 
Average Hourly Earnings of 2.8 per cent while the public sector experienced albeit 
marginal but negative growth of -0.2 per cent. The latter result could reflect an 
increase of employment in the public service at lower wage levels resulting in 
reduced overall Average Hourly Earnings. 
 
Our inflation forecasts for 2015 and 2016 are presented in Table 1. We expect 
annual inflation as measured by the CPI to fall marginally by 0.1 per cent in 2015. 
We then expect inflation to rise to 1 per cent in 2016 as the ECB continues 
monetary easing to support Euro Area inflation, and as domestic activity – and in 
particular greater levels of consumption – increase aggregate demand. On the 
basis of increased labour demand and some tightening in the labour market, we 
expect average growth in earnings to reach 2 per cent in 2015 and to grow by a 
further 2.3 per cent in 2016. As well as growth in earnings, the expected deflation 
means that households will experience an increase in real disposable income. 
 
TABLE 1   Inflation Measures 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 
  Annual Change 
  % % % % 
CPI 0.5 0.2 -0.1 1.0 
Personal Consumption Deflator 1.7 1.7 1.0 1.5 
HICP 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.2 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI forecasts. 
 
Demand 
 
Household Sector Consumption  
Quarterly National Accounts data for Quarter 3 show that growth in personal 
consumption increased in the third quarter, up by 3.6 per cent on the same 
period in 2014. The retail sales index has been strong throughout much of 2015, 
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with the volume of sales in July being the highest since July 2008. Exchequer 
Returns, VAT receipts and the continuing improvement in the labour market, 
coupled with rising consumer sentiment suggest that the growth in personal 
consumption will be higher this year than had been previously anticipated. Thus, 
we are now forecasting that growth in the volume of personal consumption will 
be 3.6 per cent this year, with value growth of 4.1 per cent. This implies a 
personal consumption deflator of 0.51 per cent, indicating that inflationary 
pressures in the economy remain low.  
 
Many of the same factors are likely to underpin personal consumption growth in 
2016. Interest rates are likely to remain low and some stimulus can be expected 
as the taxation changes announced in Budget 2016 come into force. As shown in 
the Monetary and Financial Conditions section, household debt levels remain 
high and deleveraging will have to continue. However, the data also show that 
the contraction in lending for consumption purposes has reduced substantially. 
Thus, we are forecasting that growth in personal consumption in 2016 will be 
broadly in line with this year. With the expected deflator on personal 
consumption increasing to 1 per cent, the value of personal consumption growth 
in 2016 is forecast to be 4.4 per cent.  
 
Property Market Developments 
The CSO Residential Property Price Index shows that prices rose nationally by 1.6 
per cent in the month of October, up by 7.6 per cent on the same month last 
year. The Index shows that price growth in Dublin has slowed over the course of 
the year, up by 1 per cent in the month and by 4.5 per cent when compared with 
October 2014. For the first four months of the year Dublin property prices grew 
by over 20 per cent year-on-year in each month. In contrast, prices outside Dublin 
were up by 2.1 per cent in the month and by 10.7 per cent annually.  
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FIGURE 16 Growth in Residential Property Prices, Monthly and Annual Percentage Change   
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Data from the Private Residential Tenancies Board (PRTB) show that the growth 
in private rents has continued with national rents increasing by 8.6 per cent in the 
year to the third quarter of 2015. Dublin rents increased by 8.7 per cent while 
outside Dublin rents rose by 8.5 per cent in the year. Given the strong growth 
rates shown by private rents over the past couple of years a series of measures 
aimed at stabilising rents have been announced.26 The main measure announced 
is the extension of the period for rent reviews from 12 to 24 months.  
 
Other measures announced include a longer notice period of new rent, the 
provision of comparable rents in the area, and notification of rent increases to 
the PRTB. Measures are also being introduced to improve legal protection for 
tenants and to increase tenants’ awareness of their rights. 
 
A number of factors may be influencing the residential market at present. The 
introduction of the macro-prudential rules could be impacting on demand levels, 
particularly in urban areas. It may also reflect the impact of house price growth 
outstripping any growth in incomes resulting in a negative impact on 
affordability. Asking prices on daft.ie show strong price growth in the commuter 
counties at present, indicating that demand may have shifted to some locations 
with better availability and affordability. In particular, the down payment 
requirement under the new macro-prudential regulations is likely to have 
adversely impacted on affordability amongst first-time buyers in Dublin 
especially. 
 
                                                          
26  Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2015). ‘Stabilising Rents, Boosting Supply’, 
November. 
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To get an idea of future housing supply levels we build on existing research on the 
housing market; Byrne et al. (2014)27 estimate a structural level of housing 
demand, where they assume that this structural level is a function of the number 
of independent households in the State. The number of households is a product 
of population estimates and headship rates, all of which are derived from micro-
level data sources. At present, Byrne et al. (2014) estimate that, based on this 
approach, 25,000 housing units per annum are required in the Irish market. In a 
recent application Addison-Smyth and McQuinn (2015)28 use this structural level 
of housing demand as an indicator of fundamental supply in the market arguing 
that, in the long run, this structural level of demand is supplied to the market.  
 
We now examine the relationship between this long-run level of supply and 
actual supply through a standard error correction model; i.e. we assume that the 
actual level of supply is related to the long-run level, and where a divergence 
occurs, that the actual level converges back to the long-run level over time. 
Forecasts of the actual supply level can then be obtained using forecasts of the 
independent households from Byrne et al. (2014). The results can be seen in 
Figure 17 where both the actual and future level of supply and the 25,000 unit 
‘target’ are plotted. 
 
FIGURE 17 Actual and Future Levels of Housing Supply: 2000-2018   
 
 
Source:  QEC estimates. 
 
 
                                                          
27  Byrne, D. D. Duffy and J. FitzGerald (2014). Household Formation and Tenure Choice, Quarterly Economic 
Commentary Research Note, Summer. 
28  Addison-Smyth D. and K. McQuinn (2015). ‘Assessing the Sustainable Nature of Housing-Related Taxation Receipts: 
The Case of Ireland’, ESRI Working Paper No. 503.  
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Results from the exercise suggest that, if the historical relationship between the 
long-run fundamental price and the change in actual price holds into the future, 
then it will be 2018 at the earliest before the underlying demand in the market is 
met. 
  
Given the shortages of supply in the Irish housing market and the ongoing policy 
debate concerning this issue, it is interesting to examine the provision of social 
housing through time. In Figure 18 we plot the total number of both local 
authority and voluntary non-profit housing provided in the Irish State since 1970. 
This is complemented with the percentage of the total number of houses 
constructed due to social housing over the same period.29 
 
FIGURE 18 Local Authority and Voluntary Non-Profit Houses: 1970-2015 
 
 
Source:  Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government and QEC estimates. 
 
Also included are the targets specified in the Government’s Social Housing 
Strategy 2020 (2014). It is clear that there has been a significant decline in the 
provision of social and voluntary housing since 2009 with just over 5,500 units 
built since then.30 This is true both in the case of the actual units built and the 
percentage of the total number of housing units accounted for by social housing. 
Interestingly, at times during the 1970s and 1980s, social housing accounted for 
nearly one-third of the total stock of housing built in the economy for a given 
year. 
 
                                                          
29  Note: Care should be exercised in comparing data for this series between pre-2009 and post-2010. Up to 2010, 
completions relating to long term voids and demountables were included as new build completions.  
30  The Government commits to the provision of 35,000 social housing units over the six-year period 2015-2020 and the 
provision of 18,000 units over the period 2015-2018.  
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Furthermore, the targets outlined in the Government’s official response to the 
social housing issue indicate that over 5,800 units will have to be built per annum 
over the six-year period 2015-2020. Given the relatively low level of social 
housing units constructed in 2015, this suggests that this target is already under 
pressure.  
 
Having peaked at close to 24 per cent in 2010, the vacancy rate for office 
property in the Dublin market is now estimated to be below 8 per cent. With no 
construction taking place for a number of years as a result of the financial crisis, 
activity levels have picked up and it is estimated that there is currently 2.1 million 
square feet of office space under construction in the Dublin market. 31 However, 
it is unlikely that substantial new office space will be supplied before 2017, with 
concerns that this could limit expansion of existing firms or the ability to attract 
new FDI.32 
 
FIGURE 19 Dublin Office Market Statistics 
 
 
Source:  Jones Lang LaSalle. 
 
 
                                                          
31  Jones Lang LaSalle, Dublin Office Market report Q3 2015.  
32  Duffy, D. and H. Dwyer (2015). ‘FDI and the availability of Dublin Office Space’ Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Research Note, Autumn. 
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Supply 
 
Investment 
The third quarter National Accounts show that gross domestic fixed capital 
formation, investment, grew by over 35 per cent compared to the third quarter 
of 2014. However, this is due to the purchases of patents, and underlying growth 
is not as strong as suggested by the headline numbers. As highlighted in previous 
Commentaries investment in building and construction has grown strongly in 
2015. Indicators suggest that the level of house completions in 2015 will be only 
marginally higher than that achieved in 2014. Based on completions data and the 
CSO Index of Building and Construction, the volume of new residential 
investment is forecast to grow by over 14 per cent this year. However, as we have 
previously pointed out, this growth rate is from a very low base and so the 
increase in the level of completions will be moderate. We expect that, following 
completions of 11,016 last year, completions will reach 12,500 in 2015.  
 
With demand for accommodation continuing to be strong, the need to boost 
housing supply remains important. A range of measures has been announced 
including a targeted development contribution rebate; the use of the Strategic 
Investment Fund to support housing-related enabling infrastructure in priority 
development areas; new planning guidelines on apartment standards; and the 
introduction of new legislative provisions for Strategic Development Zone (SDZ) 
planning schemes. In addition, NAMA is targeting the funding of the delivery of 
20,000 residential units before the end of 2020. While these measures will 
provide some boost to residential construction, access to and the cost of funding 
remain a hurdle to development. However, both commencement notice and new 
house registration data suggest there will be some increase in activity in 2016 and 
on that basis we are forecasting that house completion will average 
approximately 13,100 in 2016. Most other forms of investment in building and 
construction seem set to continue their strong growth in 2016 reflecting low 
interest rates, low office space vacancy rates and economic growth. Thus, 
investment in building and construction is forecast to increase by 12.3 per cent in 
volume and by 13.7 per cent in value.  
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FIGURE 20 Housing Market Indicators 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and the Department of Environment, Community and Local Government. 
 
The volume of investment in machinery and equipment is forecast to increase 
this year by over 37 per cent, reflecting the acquisition of intellectual property 
rights. Assuming that a continuation of purchases of patents combined with low 
interest rates and continued economic growth are likely to encourage both 
expansion and re-equipment, volume growth of just over 19 per cent in 2016 is 
forecast. If these forecasts prove to be correct, total investment will grow by 27.2 
per cent in volume this year and by 28.5 per cent in value. In 2016 overall 
investment growth of 19.2 per cent in real terms is forecast, with the value of 
investment increasing by 22.3 per cent. As noted in the output section, the strong 
increases in investment in 2014 and 2015 results in the investment rate (as a 
percentage of GNP) in 2015 being back up to its historical average.33 
 
Labour Market 
The Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) for Q3 2015 published by the 
CSO reveals relatively robust improvements in the labour market. There was yet 
another decrease in the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate, falling from 9.6 
per cent in Q2 to 9.1 per cent in Q3. This marks an improvement of two 
percentage points over Q3 2014 and is the twelfth consecutive quarter where the 
rate has fallen. The significant fall over the year consisted of decreases in both 
male and female levels of unemployment.  
 
The level of male unemployment fell by 23,000 or 15.3 per cent while the level 
for females fell by 19,500 or 20.5 per cent over the year to Q3 2015. The number 
of persons classified as long-term unemployed decreased by 29,400 or 21.1 per 
cent over the year to Q3 2015. The long-term unemployment rate is now 5 per 
 
                                                          
33  Over the period 1960-2015.  
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cent compared to 6.4 per cent in Q3 2014. Short-term unemployment also 
decreased, falling by 14,900 or 14.5 per cent.  
 
Breaking down the age composition of the unemployment rate shows that youth 
(15-24 year-old) unemployment has continued its downward trend. Figure 21 
shows the evolution of the seasonally-adjusted youth unemployment rate since 
2013 and it currently stands at 19.7 per cent in October. This is still relatively high 
compared to historic levels and suggests there is further room for the rate to fall 
moving into 2016. 
 
FIGURE 21 Youth Unemployment Rate  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The relatively new monthly unemployment release from the CSO, which has 
officially replaced the standardised unemployment rate, shows unemployment in 
November of 8.9 per cent (Figure 22) compared to 10.4 per cent in November 
2014. This decline in the unemployment rate is particularly important in an Irish 
context where, as noted by Kelly and McQuinn (2014),34 unemployment is highly 
significant as far as movements in variables such as house prices and mortgage 
arrears is concerned. Therefore, in addition to the usual macroeconomic benefits, 
an improvement in the labour market also has positive implications for key Irish 
financial stability indicators. 
 
Employment growth was once again positive in Q3 with an annual increase of 2.9 
per cent, representing an increase of 56,000. This compares to an annual increase 
of 3.0 per cent last quarter and an increase of 1.4 per cent in the year to Q3 2014. 
A breakdown of the figures reveals that employment increased in 12 of the 14 
 
                                                          
34  Kelly R. and K. McQuinn (2014). ‘On the hook for impaired bank lending: Do sovereign-bank inter-linkages affect the 
net cost of a fiscal stimulus?’ International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 10(2), pp.95-128. 
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sectors in the economy, suggesting a broad, economy-wide improvement. Among 
the sectors, the largest growth was observed in the construction sector of 13.3 
per cent or 14,900 and the industry sector of 5.7 per cent or 13,500. The largest 
rate of decline occurred in the financial, insurance and real estate activities 
sector, falling 3.2 per cent or 3,300. As well as being broad-based, the increase in 
employment is exclusively driven by growth in full-time jobs.  
 
CSO data show that public sector employment also increased in the year to Q3 
2015 by 1.2 per cent from 371,800 to 376,300. A further breakdown of sectors 
within the public sector reveals that health saw the largest increase in the year to 
Q3 2015, rising by 2.4 per cent while defence saw the largest decrease, falling 1.0 
per cent. 
 
FIGURE 22 Unemployment Rate  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Growth in annual employment over the past year has been reasonably well 
dispersed geographically. The most recent figures suggest that employment 
increased in all regions bar the West. It is, however important to note that the 
base levels and growth rates vary greatly between the regions as Table 2 shows. 
 
As mentioned in the Autumn Commentary, the number of persons in the labour 
force is affected by changes in the size of the working-age population. This is 
known as the demographic effect and it continues to exert negative pressure on 
the labour force. In Q3 2015 this effect contributed to a decline of 3,700 in the 
overall change in the labour force. This negative demographic effect is exclusively 
concentrated in the 20-24 and 25-34 age groups. This highlights the importance 
of not only encouraging young people to enter the labour market but also of 
attracting back young emigrants. The Youth Guarantee programme implemented 
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by the government is an attempt to reduce youth unemployment rates and the 
risk of long-term youth unemployment. The problem is not without issues, 
however, as an upcoming report35 highlights. The report finds that there are 
resource limitations associated with the implementation of the Youth Guarantee. 
There are also concerns with the lack of availability of quality employment offers 
and the effectiveness of the education and training offers available to Youth 
Guarantee participants. 
 
Previous Commentaries noted that the participation rate had been decreasing 
towards the end of 2014. For the first three quarters of 2015 the rate has 
increased from 59.4 in Q1 to 60.5 in Q3. If this positive development continues 
we can expect the level of employment to increase above two million in early 
2016, a level not seen since 2008. 
 
TABLE 2 Annual % Change in Employment by Region  
Employment (000's) Q3 2014 Q3 2015 Annual % Change 
Border 190.7 195.4 2.5 
Midland 112.8 119.2 5.7 
West 181.9 180.2 -0.9 
Dublin 576.5 605.6 5.0 
Mid-East 229.6 231.2 0.7 
Mid-West 155.6 157.4 1.2 
South-East 202.6 207.4 2.4 
South-West 277.2 286.5 3.4 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
In terms of international comparisons our employment rate of 63.1 per cent is 
still slightly lower than the employment rate in the EU28 of 65.5 per cent. The 
highest level of unemployment in the EU28 in Q2 2015 was recorded in Greece 
and Spain, of 24.6 and 22.4 per cent respectively while the lowest rate of 4.7 per 
cent was recorded in Germany. The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate for 
the month of October saw Ireland’s rate at 8.9 per cent while the EU28 rate was 
9.3 per cent. 
 
In the Autumn Commentary, Ireland’s recent economic performance was 
examined in the context of the downturn experienced post-2007/2008. In 
particular, much of the initial wave of the recovery was attributed to an increase 
in competitiveness resulting in export-led growth. In Figure 23 we plot Irish unit 
 
                                                          
35  Mc Guinness, S. and A. Whelan (2015), ‘Implementation of the 2013 Recommendation on establishing a Youth 
Guarantee’, Unpublished report for the European Commission. 
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labour costs since 2000 to highlight the significant reduction in competitiveness 
prior to 2007 and the significant improvement since then. 
 
FIGURE 23 Irish Unit Labour Costs: 2000-2015 
 
 
 
Source:  European Central Bank Statistical Warehouse.  
Note: Data are unit labour cost based on persons and are seasonally adjusted. 
 
The deterioration in competitiveness from about 2003 onwards is clearly 
apparent with labour costs peaking at the end of 2008. Thereafter, wage costs fell 
considerably with the index in Q2 2015 now back to 2003 levels. Within the total 
fall in wages there are substantial compositional effects with the fall-off in 
employment in the construction sector post-2008 likely to have had a significant 
impact on overall costs.  
 
Broadly in line with our forecasts from the previous Commentary as economic 
conditions have remained strong, we expect the average annual unemployment 
rate to reach 9.3 per cent by the end of 2015 and 7.9 per cent by 2016. We also 
forecast employment growth to remain robust in 2015 and reach the two million 
mark early in 2016.  
 
Public Finances 
The Exchequer Returns show that 2015 has been a very good year for the public 
finances. Returns to November illustrate that in the first 11 months of the year, 
tax revenue was 10 per cent higher than the same period in 2014, at €41.97 
billion. This is 7.5 per cent higher than had been anticipated at the start of the 
year and is driven by much higher than anticipated receipts from corporation tax, 
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which had increased by 52 per cent year-on-year. Total expenditure36 was 
marginally lower than profile by the end of November with higher than 
anticipated current expenditure being offset by lower capital expenditure and 
lower national debt interest. 
 
Given the strength of growth in the economy reflected in the public finances over 
the course of the year, we have revised upwards our expectations for tax 
revenue. As highlighted above this is primarily the result of much higher 
corporation tax receipts. The White Paper on Receipts and Expenditure indicated 
that growth in expenditure in 2015 was likely to be higher by approximately €1.5 
billion. However, in spite of some expenditure items being brought forward and 
over-runs on other expenditure items, the Exchequer Returns to the end of 
November indicate that the over-run for the year will be much smaller in scale. 
Based on these flows, it now seems likely that the general government deficit will 
be €2.3 billion in 2015, equivalent to -1.1 per cent of GDP. This reflects in part the 
high level of corporation tax receipts this year. 
 
With economic and employment growth set to continue next year, it seems 
reasonable to expect that we will see a further substantial reduction in the 
deficit. Having accounted for 11 per cent of total tax revenue in 2014, corporation 
tax represented 15 per cent of revenue in 2015. Analysis by the Revenue 
Commissioners suggests that the increase reflects improved trading conditions 
associated with increased sales of internationally traded products. The Revenue 
Commissioners also expect that much of the higher corporation tax receipts will 
re-occur in 2016. However, annual changes in corporation tax receipts have 
tended to be volatile in nature and so some caution should be exercised with 
regard to receipts from this tax head in 2016. Taking account of our growth 
forecasts and assuming that the level of corporation tax receipts is not a 
temporary boost, the deficit is projected to decline to €1.2 billion, just over -0.5 
per cent of GDP. 
 
An integral component of the evaluation of medium-term fiscal policy is the 
multi-annual budgetary projection released by the Department of Finance each 
year. These projections of planned expenditure in different Government 
departments can, ex-post, be compared with the actual outturns for the 
particular year. For example, when the SPU is released initially (May of 2015), any 
overall assessment of the fiscal stance outlined is based on the forecasts of 
Government expenditure from end 2014. While there is any number of reasons 
why disparities can arise in the accuracy of such forecasts, particularly in volatile 
economic conditions, it is to be hoped that the forecast accuracy can be 
 
                                                          
36  Excluding transactions with no general government impact. 
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minimised in general and improved through time. In Figure 24 below, the one 
year ahead forecast error for gross Government current expenditure is plotted 
from 2000 onwards. One year ahead forecast relates to the forecast at the end of 
year t for expenditure in t+1. 
 
FIGURE 24 Gross Current Expenditure Deviation from Forecast: 2000-2015 
 
 
Source:  Reproduced by kind permission of the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council. 
 
What is clear from the graph is the degree to which actual Government 
expenditure has deviated from the forecast level in 2014 and 2015. In 2015 the 
error at 4 per cent is particularly large. This contrasts sharply with the manner in 
which actual Government expenditure was in line with forecasts over the period 
2011-2013. Analysis of the gross voted expenditure data suggests that overruns 
in the Department of Health are one of the main reasons for the deviation in 
2015. 
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General Assessment 
 
With an annual growth rate of 6.7 per cent, the Irish economy is set for a 
remarkable performance in 2015; this is the highest year-on-year growth in GDP 
since 2005. Overall, the growth performance for the present year shows a change 
in the composition from external trade to an increasing contribution from 
domestic sources; investment and consumption. While high levels of household 
debt and other financial crisis legacy issues continue to impact on many in the 
Irish economy, consumption has increased significantly among certain cohorts of 
the Irish population. The Nowcasting model indicates that growth was fairly 
evenly spread throughout the year with Q2 and Q3 experiencing particularly 
strong quarter-on-quarter growth rates. 
 
Our expectation is that GNP will grow by 5.2 per cent in 2015. In 2014 GNP grew 
by almost 7 per cent contrasting with the 5.2 per cent increase in GDP for the 
same period. The rather large discrepancy between the two measures of output 
for this year and last is mainly due to the profit repatriation policies of some 
multinational firms (see FitzGerald, 201537 for more on this). This highlights the 
well-documented volatility in key Irish macroeconomic variables attributable to 
the relatively large presence of these firms. The recent takeover by Pfizer of 
Allergan will make Ireland home to the world’s largest pharmaceutical company. 
While it is unclear whether there will be substantial taxation revenue benefits 
from having such an entity located in this jurisdiction, the potential impact on the 
volatility of key economic indicators should not be ignored. 
 
While the previous Commentary noted that the economy was still in recovery 
phase, the cumulative effects of the strong performances in 2014, 2015 and 
expected outcome in 2016 should see the Irish economy returning to its potential 
level of output. To that effect, in the Output section of the present Commentary, 
we examine the recent Irish economic performance in light of longer-term trends 
in key economic variables. While unemployment rates currently at over 9 per 
cent indicate that the economy is still somewhat below its full capacity, the 
overall assessment of potential output is somewhat nuanced by the exceptionally 
strong rates of productivity growth observed in the Irish economy since 2011. 
Both labour productivity and total factor productivity in the Irish case have been 
growing at significant rates and consequently underpinning much of the post-
2011 recovery. In that regard, the trends in these productivity rates are at 
 
                                                          
37  For more on this see FitzGerald J. (2015). ‘Problems Interpreting National Accounts in a Globalised Economy – 
Ireland’. Special article Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer. 
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variance with the decline observed more generally across most European and 
North American economies.  
 
Over time it is reasonable to assume, however, that as greater levels of both 
labour and capital are employed in the economy, these strong increases in 
productivity will moderate back to longer-run trends. Therefore, given this 
likelihood and other factors in the economy, we believe that the Irish output gap, 
as at the end of 2015, is approximately minus one per cent. The output gap, 
particularly given developments in the European fiscal surveillance architecture 
and the budgetary rule, is of increasing importance as it ultimately determines 
the degree of fiscal space which exists for domestic policymakers.  
 
In May of this year the Government released the Stability Programme Update 
(SPU) and signalled that the forthcoming budget would see an overall 
expansionary package of approximately €1.5 billion split between taxation 
measures and expenditure. In the Autumn Commentary we signalled that, given 
the apparent strength of the recovery in 2015, a neutral fiscal stance was the 
most appropriate position to take at this point. However, the pro-cyclical nature 
of the budgetary stance was compounded by the publication of the White Paper 
on Receipts and Expenditure. This indicated that voted Government expenditure 
(essentially day-to-day Government expenditure) was about €1.3 billion more 
than had been outlined in the SPU, thereby indicating that a stimulus of almost 
€2.8 billion was actually in effect for the Irish economy, reinforcing the pro-
cyclical nature of the original package. It appears that most of the greater than 
expected expenditure occurred in the health area where current and capital 
expenditure in the year to October were significantly greater than forecast at the 
onset of 2015. This lack of fiscal discipline in health expenditure undermines the 
budgetary process and the spirit of the SPU which seeks to provide a medium-
term fiscal plan compliant with the European Semester. The OECD, for example, 
in its latest economic survey of Ireland,38 has highlighted, as a key 
recommendation, improved efficiency in health spending in ensuring future fiscal 
sustainability. This is not to suggest that the health area should not be in receipt 
of significant expenditure, merely to underline the volatility of the actual 
expenditure when compared with the initial projection. 
 
In a Special Article Callan, Colgan, Logue, Savage and Walsh provide the 
customary analysis of the distributive impact of the budget. Using the ESRI tax-
benefit ‘SWITCH’ model, the analysis suggests that Budget 2016 delivers similar 
income to the lowest-income quintile as a wage-indexed budget. For other 
income quintiles, Budget 2016 raises incomes by between half and three-quarters 
 
                                                          
38  Available online at www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Ireland-2015-overview.pdf.  
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of 1 per cent above the level that a neutral budget would provide. The small scale 
of this overall impact contrasts with perceptions of Budget 2016 as a major 
‘giveaway’. This is because, with wage growth of close to two and a half per cent, 
the cost of a neutral budget – keeping average tax rates constant and welfare 
payments growing in line with wages – is itself substantial. Note the analysis 
includes the impact of the increase in the national minimum wage on the 
incomes of low-wage workers, but does not capture the potential impact on 
employers or owners of businesses employing these low-wage workers. 
 
In a Special Article, Morley, Duffy and McQuinn conduct a review of housing 
supply policies in Ireland and internationally. This analysis, which comes as a 
timely contribution to the ongoing debate about supply-side issues in the Irish 
housing market, critically appraises different governmental approaches observed 
across countries used to tackle the issue of housing supply. Amongst the different 
aspects of government policy which potentially impact on housing supply, three 
measures are highlighted (i) planning regulations, (ii) taxation and (iii) 
infrastructural costs. International evidence identifies lower supply elasticity in 
countries with strict land-use and planning regulations, in particular in countries 
where it takes longer to acquire a building permit. Land taxes that increase in line 
with house/land prices are also shown to act as an incentive to sell/use 
underdeveloped or vacant land in periods of increased demand, while 
Government grants to subsidise stalled developments may provide some 
assistance in alleviating supply-side pressures. However, evidence from the UK 
suggests such grants can be difficult to implement effectively and the success of 
such schemes is notoriously difficult to quantify. 
 
As far as housing matters are concerned, the recent debate on rent certainty was 
disappointing in that it is somewhat tangential to the major issue confronting the 
Irish property market; namely the lack of a significant housing supply response. 
While the rental measures outlined in November may provide some comfort to 
those experiencing sharp increases in the cost of accommodation, most 
importantly, the measures will not increase the provision of housing in the 
market. Recent research (Duffy et al., 201539), along with estimates in the 
Commentary, suggests that it may take another three years before the level of 
housing supply in the Irish economy can meet the underlying structural demand 
for housing which currently exists. 
 
In the Property Market Developments section of the Commentary, the historical 
provision of social housing in the Irish market is detailed and recent trends are 
 
                                                          
39  D. Duffy, D. Foley and K. McQuinn (2015). ‘Cross-country residential investment rates and the implications for supply 
response in Ireland’, Paper to the joint EU Commission / ESRI Seminar: Housing Ireland’s Recovery: Policy 
perspectives, Dublin, November.  
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then compared with social housing targets outlined in Social Housing Policy 2020 
(2014). It is clear that these targets will be difficult to meet, in particular the 
commitment to provide 18,000 units over the period 2015-2018. Given the 
difficulties confronting the supply side of the Irish market (summarised recently 
in Barrett et al., 2015),40 it is increasingly evident that one way for increased 
social housing to be provided is for the Government to engage, as previously 
happened, in an active policy of local authority housing provision. For example, 
over the period 2001 to 2009, between local authority and voluntary non-profit 
housing, over 51,000 units were provided in the Irish market. This compares with 
a total of 5,689 units from these sources since then.  
 
We revise upwards marginally our outlook for the Irish economy in 2016; we now 
expect growth of 4.8 per cent in output with both consumption and investment 
expected to grow significantly. While export demand is also likely to be a key 
driver of growth next year, there are a number of risks for the traded sector of 
the Irish economy in the short to medium term. 
 
One potential risk is the slowdown envisaged in 2016 in global trade (see OECD, 
2015).41 This is mainly centred amongst emerging economies where weaker 
commodity prices and lower potential output growth have caused recessions in 
countries such as Brazil and Russia. The other major concern in this regard is 
China. Some commentators (e.g. Buiter, 2015)42 are now forecasting a hard 
landing for the Chinese economy in 2016. Were China to enter recession in 2016, 
it is entirely feasible that other emerging markets along with Russia and Brazil 
would also experience a downturn. All of these cases mainly represent secondary 
difficulties for the Irish economy in that they will only have a domestic impact 
through our major trading partners such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Europe. However any decline in overall world trade will ultimately 
hurt the export prospects of the Irish economy. 
 
Another key trade related issue which may arise in 2016 is the likelihood of a UK 
referendum on EU membership. The potential for a UK exit from the EU (Brexit), 
which is the subject of a recent ESRI report (Barrett et al., 2015), poses a variety 
of difficulties for the Irish economy on a number of fronts. Estimates from the 
literature suggest that Brexit would significantly reduce bilateral trade flows by 
up to 20 per cent between Ireland and the UK. This impact would differ 
significantly across sectors and products. For merchandise trade in particular, 
trade is very concentrated in a few product types, which implies that increased 
 
                                                          
40  Barrett, A., D. Duffy and K. McQuinn (2015). ‘Tax Breaks and the Residential Property Market’, report by the Economic 
and Social Research Institute submitted to the Department of Finance, September.  
41  OECD Economic Outlook (2015). Available online at: www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/economicoutlook.htm.  
42  Buiter W. (2015). ‘Is China Leading the World into Recession?’, Global Economic View, Citibank. Available online at: 
http://willembuiter.com/China2015.pdf.  
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trade barriers for the most important products would have a particularly 
significant impact on total trade volumes. The sectors where the impacts are 
likely to be the most severe include Agriculture, Food and Beverages and Basic 
Metals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Detailed Forecast Tables 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A1 Exports of Goods and Services 
 
2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 98.7 14.8 16.1 113.3 24.7 15.5 141.3 12.3 8.0 158.7 
Tourism 3.4 8.5 6.6 3.7 6.5 6.0 3.9 4.2 3.2 4.1 
Other Services 89.3 9.8 7.8 98.1 16.0 10.5 113.8 12.6 7.3 128.2 
Exports Of Goods and Services 191.4 12.3 12.1 215.0 20.5 13.1 258.9 12.3 7.6 290.8 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0 
  
0.0   0.0 
Adjusted Exports 191.4 12.3 12.1 215.0 20.5 13.1 259.0 12.3 7.6 290.9 
 
 
 
Forecast Table A2 Investment 
 
2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 3.2 20.0 13.5 3.8 13.1 5.7 4.3 21.6 18.4 5.2 
Other Building 7.2 11.2 6.2 8.0 10.6 6.2 8.8 15.4 10.4 10.2 
Transfer Costs 0.5 48.9 35.7 0.7 10.4 15.0 0.8 26.0 20.0 1.0 
Building and Construction 10.8 15.5 9.7 12.5 11.4 6.6 13.9 18.0 13.4 16.4 
Machinery and Equipment 20.8 15.1 16.7 24.0 37.4 37.3 33.0 24.2 21.4 40.9 
Total Investment 31.7 15.3 14.3 36.5 28.5 27.2 46.9 22.3 19.2 57.4 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A3 Personal Income 
 
2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc 3.2 6.4 0.2 3.4 1.0 0.0 3.4 2.5 0.1 3.5 
Non-Agricultural Wages 67.7 3.5 2.4 70.0 4.9 3.4 73.5 5.0 3.7 77.1 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 16.4 18.9 3.1 19.5 38.4 7.5 26.9 19.3 5.2 32.1 
Total Income Received 87.2 6.5 5.6 92.9 11.8 10.9 103.8 8.6 8.9 112.8 
Current Transfers 24.1 -1.4 -0.3 23.7 -1.0 -0.2 23.5 -1.3 -0.3 23.2 
Gross Personal Income 111.3 4.8 5.3 116.6 9.2 10.7 127.3 6.8 8.6 135.9 
Direct Personal Taxes 25.4 7.7 1.9 27.3 6.0 1.6 28.9 4.6 1.3 30.3 
Personal Disposable Income 85.9 3.9 3.4 89.3 10.1 9.1 98.3 7.4 7.3 105.6 
Consumption 85.7 3.8 3.2 89.0 4.1 3.7 92.6 4.4 4.1 96.7 
Personal Savings 0.2 
 
0.1 0.3 
 
5.4 5.7  3.2 8.9 
Savings Ratio 0.2 
  
0.4 
  
5.8   8.4 
Average Personal Tax Rate 22.5 
  
23.3 
  
22.6   22.2 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 Imports of Goods and Services  
 
2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 63.6 11.4 11.3 70.9 10.2 7.5 78.1 9.7 7.4 85.6 
Tourism 4.7 -2.3 -2.7 4.6 5.1 2.0 4.8 4.9 1.8 5.0 
Other Services 88.4 18.5 18.1 104.8 25.7 22.0 131.7 15.4 12.0 151.9 
Imports of Goods and Services 156.8 15.0 0.0 180.3 19.1 0.0 214.6 13.0 0.0 242.6 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0 
  
-0.2   -0.2 
Adjusted Imports 156.8 15.0 14.7 180.3 18.9 15.7 214.4 13.0 10.1 242.4 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 Balance of Payments 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 191.4 215.0 258.9 290.8 
Imports of Goods and Services 156.8 180.3 214.6 242.6 
Net Factor Payments -27.4 -26.2 -31.0 -32.0 
Net Transfers -2.9 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 
Balance on Current Account 4.3 6.0 10.8 13.8 
As a % of GNP 2.8 3.7 5.9 6.9 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 Employment and Unemployment, Annual Average 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
000s 000s 000s 000s 
Agriculture 106.8 109.0 111.1 111.8 
Industry 342.5 348.4 375.7 382.0 
Of which: Construction 102.0 109.4 124.9 125.0 
Services 1,430.9 1,453.3 1,475.4 1,524.2 
Total at Work 1,880.2 1,913.7 1,967.4 2,018.0 
Unemployed 282.4 243.2 199.5 173.0 
Labour Force 2,163.4 2,156.9 2,166.9 2,191.0 
Unemployment Rate, % 13.0 11.3 9.3 7.9 
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Nowcasting Appendix 
 
Throughout 2015 we have provided quarterly updates for GDP estimates based 
on the Nowcasting43 model. Table 1 shows the Nowcast and forecast of GDP in 
the final two quarters of 2015.  
 
TABLE 1  Current Backcast and Nowcast of Irish Quarter-on-Quarter GDP Growth Rates 
 
Period Nature of Estimate GDP Estimate % 95% Confidence Interval 
Q3 2015 Backcast 1.36   
Q4 2015 Nowcast 1.54 0.12 2.96 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
Through 2015, the Nowcasting has consistently suggested a growth rate of at 
least 6.5 per cent per annum for GDP. This matches the latest data from the CSO 
for Quarter 3, which indicates that GDP growth in Ireland for 2015 will be 7 per 
cent with the economy growing by 1.4 per cent between Q2 and Q3 this year. The 
Nowcast estimates provided in Table 1 suggest that growth will be slightly 
stronger in the final quarter of the year. Therefore, for the year as a whole, the 
Nowcasting suggests a growth rate of just over 6.8 per cent 
 
As we noted in the Autumn Commentary the Nowcasting model to date has 
provided quite an accurate assessment of Irish output levels. Given the variances 
being observed in Irish economic performance over the past period of time, 
having an approach which provides a timely and accurate assessment of the 
underlying state of the economy is of particular benefit in generating the overall 
forecast of the economy in the Commentary. 
 
 
 
                                                          
43  A detailed discussion of the Nowcasting model can be found in Byrne, D., K. McQuinn and C. Morley (2014). 
‘Nowcasting and the Need for Timely Estimates of Movements in Irish Output, Research Note, 2014/3/1, ESRI 
Quarterly Economic Commentary. 
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Distributional Impact of Tax, Welfare and 
Public Service Pay Policies: Budget 2016 and 
Budgets 2009-2016 
Tim Callan, Brian Colgan, Caitríona Logue, Michael Savage,  
John R. Walsh1 
Abstract 
This article analyses the distributive impact of Budget 2016 using SWITCH, the 
ESRI tax-benefit model. The model analyses budgetary impacts on the nationally 
representative sample of households provided by the CSO’s Survey on Income 
and Living Conditions. The impact of budgetary policy is measured against a 
distributionally-neutral budget, indexed in line with expected wage growth of just 
over 2.3 per cent in 2016. A similar analysis is also conducted on the distributive 
impact of budgetary policy over the eight years from 2009 to 2016. 
 
Compared with a wage-indexed benchmark, we find that Budget 2016 led to a 
modest increase – just under 0.7 per cent – in aggregate household disposable 
income (i.e. incomes including welfare payments and net of income tax, USC and 
PRSI). For the 20 per cent of households with the lowest incomes, on average 
Budget 2016 will have a similar impact to a neutral, wage-indexed budget. For 
most other income groups, changes in Budget 2016 will lead to gains of close to 
0.5 per cent up to 1 per cent, as compared with a neutral or wage-indexed 
budget. 
 
By contrast, budgets over the 2009 to 2016 period have given rise to substantial 
income losses at all income levels, as budget deficits were reduced. These may be 
termed ‘policy-induced losses’ to distinguish them from falls in income arising 
from unemployment, lower wages or falling self-employment incomes. For most 
income groups, these losses were between 7½ per cent and just over 10 per cent. 
The greatest policy-induced losses were for the top income group, at just over 14 
per cent, and the lowest income group, at 12¾ per cent.  
Analysis at family unit level reveals that policy-induced losses ranged between 9 
and 11 per cent for most family types from the combined effects of Budgets 2009 
 
                                                          
1  We thank CSO for access to SILC data on which the SWITCH tax-benefit model is based. We are grateful to Sean Lyons 
and Anne Pentecost for estimates of the distributional impact of indirect taxes. We thank anonymous referees for 
comments; any remaining errors or obscurities are the responsibility of the authors. 
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to 2016. The greatest proportionate losses, close to 20 per cent, were for single 
unemployed people without children – mainly those affected by cuts in payment 
rates for the young unemployed. The lowest losses were for those in receipt of 
old age pensions, as pension payment rates were increased by Budgets 2009 and 
2016. 
 
Introduction 
In this article we examine the distributional impact of the main tax and welfare 
measures in Budget 2016, together with the increase in the National Minimum 
Wage and the expansion of the scheme providing free pre-school places. We also 
consider the combined impact of budgetary policies since Budget 2009, which 
marked the start of Ireland’s fiscal adjustment in response to the economic crisis. 
 
The analysis uses SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model,2 to ensure that we obtain 
a nationally representative picture based on SILC (Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions), the CSO’s main survey of household income. The scale, depth and 
diversity of this survey allows it to provide an overall picture of the impact of the 
budget on Irish households, which cannot be gained from selected example 
cases. The areas covered by SWITCH, including income tax, PRSI, USC, property 
tax, welfare benefits and public service remuneration, account for the bulk of the 
impact of budgetary policy changes on households’ cash incomes in recent years. 
Last year the model was also extended to take account of water charges and the 
water conservation grant. There are, however, some taxes (e.g. indirect taxes, 
which affect the purchasing power of cash incomes) which cannot at present be 
integrated fully within the modelling framework; for a number of these we 
extend the analysis using other evidence.3  
 
We do not, in general, attempt to measure the impact of cuts in public services 
on households at different income levels.4 While this is an important area, there 
is no agreed standard methodology for the attribution of benefits from public 
spending to households. Thus, there is no agreed international approach which 
can simply be applied to Ireland. In recent years the UK Treasury (HM Treasury, 
 
                                                          
2  See Callan et al. (2013a) for a full description of the model. 
3  The methods referred to deal with the introduction of a carbon tax and a later increase in its rate; changes to VAT; 
increases in the Deposit Interest Retention Tax (DIRT); restrictions on pension tax reliefs for high income earners; 
restrictions on tax relief for medical insurance premia; and increases in Capital Gains Tax (CGT). For further details see 
Callan et al. (2013b). 
4   The inclusion of a valuation for the pre-school place provided under the Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) 
scheme is an exception. This arose from the fact that ECCE partially replaced a cash payment (Early Childcare 
Supplement). 
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2014) has begun to publish analyses which seek to distribute the value of public 
spending across the household income distribution. O’Dea and Preston (2012) 
raise some questions about the assumptions made and propose some alternative 
methods, but these methods have yet to be implemented.  
 
The results we obtain relate to the ‘cash’ or ‘first round’ effects of policy changes, 
before any adjustments in individual behaviour such as changes in employment 
status or hours of work. This is by far the most common approach internationally 
(for example, this is the approach taken by the UK’s Institute for Fiscal Studies in 
its post-budget assessment, and by the Brookings/Urban Institute’s Tax Policy 
Center in the US in assessing new policy proposals). In other work (e.g. Savage et 
al., 2015a) we have examined the impact of tax and welfare changes on financial 
incentives to work such as marginal tax rates and replacement rates. The extent 
and nature of response to these financial incentives has also been examined in 
Layte and Callan (2001) and in Callan et al. (2009). The findings of such research 
need also to be taken into account when policy is trying to balance the 
sometimes conflicting objectives of equity and efficiency. 
 
In this article, our focus is on impacts of budgetary policy at different income 
levels. Elsewhere (Savage et al., 2015b) we examine the overall evolution of the 
distribution of income and of risks of poverty. In future work we will update this 
using the results of the most recent Survey on Income and Living Conditions (CSO, 
2015), which shows broad stability in income distribution developments between 
2013 and 2014. 
 
Measuring the Distributional Impact of Policy 
What has been the overall impact of Budget 2016 at different income levels and 
on different family types? How has the sequence of budgets since October 2008 
affected households at different income levels? Analysis based on a large-scale 
nationally representative sample of households is essential in answering such 
questions. Calculations for selected example households, such as a one-earner 
couple with two children, cannot give an accurate picture of the impact of the 
budget for the population as a whole. This requires calculations for large numbers 
of real households in a nationally representative sample. The ESRI tax-benefit 
model (SWITCH) allows us to do this: it estimates the impact of direct tax and 
welfare changes using anonymised data from the CSO’s SILC.  
 
The impact of policy change must be measured against an alternative specifying 
what would happen if the policy change did not take place (a ‘counterfactual’ 
policy). In the construction of budgets, the practice in Ireland has been to 
construct an ‘opening budget’ against which changes are measured. For tax and 
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welfare Ireland’s conventional opening budget simply freezes tax rates, credits 
and welfare payments at their existing levels, whereas the UK and the US have 
adopted differing forms of indexation with respect to prices and/or wages (see 
Appendix 1 for further details). While the frozen benchmark is useful in 
accounting terms, it would be highly misleading in an analysis of distributional 
impact.5 In normal times, with nominal wages, prices and real wages all showing 
positive growth, implementing the conventional opening budget would lead to 
real income losses for those dependent on welfare, while further up the income 
distribution incomes would rise (Callan et al. (2001), Bargain and Callan (2008)).6 
Furthermore, using the opening budget as a basis to measure policy impact 
would mean that measured policy impact would depend on government’s 
definition of this default policy – something which varies across countries, and 
can change over time. 
 
The alternative used here is a policy which indexes both tax and welfare 
parameters with respect to the expected growth or decline in wages. This ensures 
that average tax rates are held constant (i.e. no fiscal drag); and leads to 
approximately equal growth (or decline) in income across different income 
groups (Callan et al., 2001). It should be clear that this is designed to provide a 
‘distributionally neutral’ benchmark, and is not intended as a policy 
recommendation. There are many reasons why it may be desirable to depart 
from this benchmark; but having a distributionally neutral benchmark, 
independent of the default position chosen by government, is essential in 
examining the distributional impact of policy changes. 
 
We use forecasts of wage growth (or decline) to implement this approach on a 
prospective basis. Results examining the impact of Budget 2016 are based on 
forecast wage growth of 2.35 per cent – an average of the forecast wage growth 
from the current Quarterly Economic Commentary (Winter 2015; 2.3 per cent) 
and the Central Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin (Central Bank of Ireland, 2015; 2.4 per 
cent). Similarly, for income growth between 2008 and 2016 we combine these 
forecast figures with the results on wage growth from the CSO’s Earnings, Hours 
and Employment Costs Survey for the available years (2009 to 2014). Periods of 
falling wages during the recession mean that growth for the whole period (2009 
to 2016) comes to 1.7 per cent, less than the growth in 2016. 
 
 
                                                          
5  For a more detailed exposition, see Callan et al. (2001). 
6  When wages are falling, the conventional benchmark would give rise to income gains for welfare recipients and 
income losses for those in employment. 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  W i nt er  201 5 | 57 
 
 
Results shown are at the household level unless otherwise specified and are 
based on household disposable income (after taxes and benefits), adjusted for 
household size and composition, i.e. income per adult equivalent or ‘equivalised 
income’.7 
 
Budget 2016 
A wide range of taxation and welfare measures are directly included in our 
model-based analysis, including: 
• The reduction of the rates of USC, the increase of the USC exemption limit, 
and the increase of the 3 per cent USC threshold to €18,668; 
• The €5 per month increase in the standardised child benefit payment to 
€140; 
• A Christmas bonus of 75 per cent of the weekly payment for people in 
receipt of long-term social welfare payments, as against a 25 per cent 
bonus in December 2014; 
• The introduction of the new Earned Income Credit of €550 for self-
employed persons not qualifying for the PAYE Credit; 
• The introduction of a new tapered PRSI credit; 
• Increases in the Home Carer’s income threshold, in Family Income 
Supplement income thresholds, and Fuel Allowance; 
• Increases in the personal rates and increases for qualified adults of the 
State Pension, and related payments, including carers and widow(er)s 
payments; 
• The restoration of the Respite Care Grant (renamed the Carer’s Support 
Grant) to €1,700; 
• Changes to the Jobseeker’s Transitional payment means-test. 
 
Our analysis also includes an estimate of the impact of the increase in the 
National Minimum Wage (from €8.65 per hour to €9.15 per hour) on the incomes 
of low wage workers.8 It should be noted that while the increase in income for 
such workers is taken into account, there is no mechanism at present for 
 
                                                          
7  This adjusts income to take account of household size. The scale used is the same as that used by the CSO in national 
statistics relating to poverty and income distribution in Ireland, i.e. 1 for the first adult, 0.66 for subsequent adults 
and 0.33 for children aged 14 or under. 
8  In principle, the counterfactual minimum wage used here could also be indexed in line with wage growth. However, 
at present, our calculations are based on an increase of 50 cents per hour; with wage indexation this figure would be 
30 cents per hour. As the impacts of the 50 cent per hour increase are already small, this will make little difference to 
the overall results. 
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estimating the potential impact on employers or owners of businesses which will 
have to pay higher wages.9 
 
Estimates of the impact of the extension of the Early Childhood Care and 
Education (ECCE) Scheme are also included. While this does not represent a cash 
payment, we attribute a value to parents based on the cost of provision of the 
service. While this is a commonly used valuation approach, it is far from being 
perfect – for a discussion of the difficulties and some alternative approaches, see 
O’Dea and Preston (2012). A similar approach could be adopted to the extension 
of free GP care to children, and the development of a framework which would 
allow such an approach is underway. 
 
Changes to public sector pay in 2016 take quite a complex form. There are 
increases of 2.5 per cent for those on annualised salaries up to €24,000, with a 
smaller increase of 1 per cent for those on salaries above that level and up to 
€31,000. There are also reductions in the Pension Related Deduction (PRD) which 
apply more generally, and imply a fixed or flat-rate element to the effective pay 
increase for most employees. In deciding how best to treat such changes in the 
analysis, we need to recall that if the overall budget were to be indexed in line 
with private sector wage growth, then public sector pay changes would also be 
increased in line with the broad developments in private sector pay. 
 
During the recession, public sector pay was reduced sharply relative to private 
sector pay,10 and with a design which was intended to obtain particular 
distributional consequences. It was for this reason that it was included in our 
analysis of the policy response to the recession. The changes for 2016 are 
designed around an overall envelope in which public sector pay is likely to rise by 
no more than the forecast rise in overall earnings of just above 2 per cent. This 
would suggest that such pay increases belong more in the wage-indexed budget 
than as a special budgetary measure. For this reason, in our main analysis, we do 
not take account of the specific public sector pay measures for 2016. It could be 
argued, however, that the particular structure of public sector pay changes, with 
a focus on a flat rate element through the PRD, and on special increases at low 
pay rates has a distributional objective. As a result, the distributional 
consequences of these pay changes should be examined. Appendix 2, therefore, 
illustrates the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion or exclusion of public 
sector pay changes from the analysis.  
 
                                                          
9   Appendix 2 allows examination of results with and without the National Minimum Wage increase. 
10  Public sector pay had risen relative to private sector pay in previous years, as identified by Kelly et al. (2009). 
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Some changes are too complex to be included in the model at this stage. Chief 
among these are: 
• Changes to excise duties on cigarettes and the rate of motor tax; 
• The Back to Work Family Dividend, whereby long-term unemployed people 
may retain the child-related portion of their welfare payment; in full for 
one year, and 50 per cent for a second year; 
• The Housing Assistance Payment, and additional resources allocated to the 
Rental Accommodation Scheme (RAS); 
• The increase in the Capital Acquisitions Tax threshold; 
• The introduction of Paternity Benefit. 
 
Overall, the SWITCH model provides excellent coverage of the main policy 
changes in Budget 2016: the items included in the SWITCH analysis account for 
some €865 million of the tax and social insurance changes in the budget, 
representing over 90 per cent of the cost of all tax changes in Budget 2016. On 
the welfare side, SWITCH coverage is close to €400 million or almost 100 per cent 
of the cost of the welfare changes. Of those items not covered, some will have a 
positive impact on lower income groups (e.g. the Back to Work Family Dividend), 
but others will have an unfavourable impact (e.g. excise duties on tobacco). 
 
FIGURE 1 Impact of Budget 2016 – Percentage Change in Disposable Income by Income Decile Relative to 
Wage-Indexed Budget 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, at December 2015 and including changes to USC, income tax and 
welfare measures specified in the text, along with the impact of changes in the National Minimum Wage and expansion of 
the Early Childhood Care and Education scheme, valued at the cost of provision. Each income group contains one-tenth of all 
households, ranked from lowest to highest incomes. Budgetary impacts are assessed relative to a neutral budget with tax 
bands, tax credits and welfare payments increased in line with expected wage growth of 2.35 per cent. 
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Figure 1 shows the impact of Budget 2016, relative to a neutral, wage-indexed 
budget, across ten equally sized income groups (deciles) ranked from the lowest 
to the highest incomes, after adjustment for household size.11 Budget 2016, 
compared with a neutral budget, indexing tax credits and welfare payments in 
line with expected wage growth of 2.35 per cent, has little impact on the incomes 
of the two deciles with lowest incomes. Looked at another way, Budget 2016 
delivers similar income to the lowest income quintile as a wage-indexed budget: a 
substantial part of this came through the Christmas bonus rather than an 
increase in weekly payment rates. For other income deciles, Budget 2016 raises 
the incomes by between half and one per cent above the level a neutral budget 
would provide. The small scale of this overall impact contrasts with perceptions 
of Budget 2016 as a major ‘giveaway’. This is because, with wage growth of close 
to 2½ per cent, the cost of a neutrality – keeping average tax rates constant, and 
welfare payments growing in line with wages – is itself substantial. While the 
reduction in USC has attracted most attention, the freezing of income tax credits 
and bands in the face of rising incomes will, through ‘fiscal drag’, lead to a higher 
average income tax rate, offsetting a part of the USC reduction. 
 
In order to understand the impact of changes in the national minimum wage 
(NMW), one must take account of the rather limited overlap between low pay 
and household poverty. This is a feature common to many countries, and has 
been confirmed in the Irish context by a number of studies.12 Most households in 
poverty do not contain an employee; and of those which do, most do not contain 
a minimum wage employee.13 Instead, low paid employees are found in a range 
of household situations: some are adult children living in households where the 
earnings of parents ensure that the household is not in poverty, others are 
second earners, and the earnings of primary and secondary earners are sufficient 
to bring the household above the poverty line. Employees in poor households are 
more often earning wage rates above the minimum, but fall below the poverty 
line because of the number of people depending on that income, or part-time 
working at a wage above the minimum. This is the group which is targeted by 
measures such as the Family Income Supplement and the Back to Work Family 
Dividend. 
 
Given these structural features, it is not surprising that the social impact 
assessment of Budget 2016 (Department of Social Protection, 2015) finds that the 
 
                                                          
11   For details of the method used to adjust incomes for household size and composition, see footnote 7. 
12   For example, the initial study by Nolan (1993), and later studies related to the introduction of the minimum wage. A 
similar pattern can be found in the work of Collins (2015). 
13   Conversely, results in Collins (2015) indicate that 92 per cent of minimum wage employees are not in households at 
risk of poverty households (i.e. with incomes below 60 per cent of median household income per adult equivalent). 
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increase in the National Minimum Wage leads to only a small increase in the 
average income of the bottom quintile of households. Higher increases are found 
for quintiles 2, 3 and 4, with again a more limited impact on the top quintile. 
These patterns merit further investigation in the context of ongoing debate about 
the setting and structuring of the National Minimum Wage. 
 
One other feature of Budget 2016 has attracted less attention, but is important 
from the point of view of structural reform, is the postponement of revaluations 
of residential properties for property tax purposes for a period of three years; this 
could lead to significant difficulties in the future. The IMF (2015) states that 
‘maintaining timely property revaluations for revenue purposes would cement 
sustainability of the revenue base.’ This is because property taxes work best 
when there is regular updating of the valuation base. When valuations become 
outdated, disparities often emerge which bring the tax into disrepute – this was 
one of the factors which led to the demise of household rates. Pressure to defer 
revaluation is common: England has deferred revaluation for its Council Tax for 
more than 20 years. In this context, the decision to freeze property tax until 2019 
is a serious concern.  
 
Budgets 2009-2016 
We now turn to the cumulative impact of the longer-run adjustment in budgetary 
policy, from the initial Budget 2009 (October 2008) up to and including Budget 
2016. How have the changes implemented since the onset of the recession 
affected those at differing income levels? This analysis includes budgetary policy 
changes over an eight-year period, along with such measures as reductions in 
public sector pay and the introduction of water charges. Specifically, the policy 
changes analysed include all of those specified earlier for Budget 2016, along 
with: 
• the main changes to income tax, including cuts to income tax credits and 
the width of the standard rate band;  
• the introduction of Universal Social Charge and subsequent revisions; 
• elimination of the PRSI ceiling; 
• the net changes in welfare payment rates over the period, with pension 
payment rates retaining the increase awarded in October 2008, and 
working-age payments ultimately reduced below their 2008 levels; 
• net reductions in Child Benefit payment rates, with cuts in earlier years 
only partly offset by increases in 2015 and 2016; 
• reductions in Jobseeker’s Allowance for the young unemployed; 
• the impact of the public sector pension levy (Pension Related Deduction, 
PRD);  
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• explicit cuts in public service pay in 2010 and in 2013;  
• reductions in public service pensions;  
• the introduction of the Local Property Tax;  
• abolition of the Christmas Bonus in 2009, and its partial restoration in 2015 
and 2016; 
• cutbacks in certain elements of the Household Benefits Package; 
• the impact of water charges, net of the water conservation grant.14 
 
We augment the standard SWITCH model with estimates from other sources15 of 
the distributional impact of a number of other policy changes.  
 
FIGURE 2 Impact of Budgetary Policy 2009-2016 – Percentage Change in Disposable Income by Income 
Decile 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, at December 2015 incorporating the main changes in direct tax, 
welfare and public service pay/pensions, the introduction of water charges and a water conservation payment, an increased 
National Minimum Wage and expansion of ECCE; augmented by results on carbon tax and VAT, DIRT, specific Budget 2014 
restrictions of tax reliefs for pension contributions and medical insurance premia, and Capital Gains Tax as described in Callan 
et al. (2013b). 
 
The overall scale of the impact of austerity policies is determined by macro-level 
decisions regarding the size of tax increases and the extent of the reduction in 
 
                                                          
14   The rationale for this approach is given in Keane et al. (2014): ‘While water charges are not technically a “budgetary 
measure” it is our view that they need to be taken into account when considering the impact of Budget 2015. Up to 
now, water services have been financed predominantly from taxation. The introduction of user charges for water can 
be seen as replacing some of the tax financing. From the point of view of an individual household, it will see a net 
benefit if its tax bill falls by more than the new water charge, and a net cost if the water charge is greater than a tax 
reduction.’ 
15  See footnote 3. Details of the methods can be found in Callan et al. (2013b). 
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welfare payments and public service pay. The distribution of these income losses 
over income groups depends on the detail of budgetary decisions regarding tax 
structures, welfare payment rates and decisions on the structure of public service 
pay cuts. Figure 2 summarises how the adjustment is spread over income groups 
(deciles) ranked from poorest to richest, taking into account these detailed tax, 
welfare and public service pay decisions. 
 
The highest losses were for the top decile, which is estimated as having lost 14¼ 
per cent of its income due to the policy changes examined here. The bottom 
decile is estimated as having policy-induced losses of 12¾ per cent. The lowest 
losses (7½ per cent) are for the third decile, which includes a higher than average 
representation of pensioner households. Losses for other deciles are in a 
relatively narrow range, between 8.3 and 10.2 per cent.  
 
The comments we made on the pattern which emerged last year, for the 2009-
2015 period, remain apposite: the results for Budgets 2009 to 2015 cannot be 
characterised in terms of simple patterns of progressivity or regressivity. Over a 
substantial range the pattern is broadly proportional, but this does not extend to 
whole income distribution. The greatest policy-induced losses have been at the 
top of the income distribution, and the next greatest losses at the bottom. Only 
the third decile had a significantly lower loss (under 8 per cent) than others.  
 
Impact by Family Type 
The preceding analyses have examined the impact of the current budget, Budget 
2016, and the impact of all budgets 2009-2016 across the income distribution. 
Here we examine how different family types have been affected by budgetary 
policy changes. The analysis is conducted at the level of what is termed a ‘tax 
unit’, i.e. an individual or couple, together with dependent children, if any. Young 
adults including third-level students are treated as independent tax units.16 
 
Table 1 shows gains of 1.3 per cent for two-earner couples with children; 1 per 
cent for employed lone parents; and 0.8 to 0.9 per cent for single employees 
without children (about one in three of all tax units), two-earner couples without 
children, and single earner couples with children. There are smaller gains for one-
earner couples without children (0.4 per cent). Retired persons (both singles and 
couples) and non-earning lone parents would obtain under Budget 2016 a similar 
outcome to that under a wage-indexed budget. Some categories, however, fare 
less well than under a wage-indexed budget, notably single unemployed persons 
 
                                                          
16  For this analysis, only the core modelled elements can be taken into account; it is not possible to cover the additional 
elements such as VAT changes, DIRT etc. in this analysis.  
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without children, unemployed couples, and tax units not elsewhere classified (a 
category which includes those with a disability).  
 
TABLE 1 Impact of Budgetary Policy 2009-2016 – Percentage Change in Disposable Income by Family Type 
 Budget 2016 Budgets  2009-2016 
Proportion of 
Families 
 % change % change % 
Single Retired Tax Unit 0.1 -4.7 11 
Retired Couple 0.0 -5.7 8 
Single Employed without Children 0.8 -6.9 34 
All Other Tax Units -1.0 -8.6 9 
Single Earner Couple without Children 0.4 -9.5 5 
Employed Lone Parent 1.0 -9.8 5 
Dual Earner Couple without Children 0.9 -9.8 9 
Dual Earner Couple with Children 1.3 -10.1 9 
Single Earner Couple with Children 0.8 -10.7 9 
Non-Earning Lone Parent  0.0 -10.7 1 
Unemployed Couple -0.5 -11.2 1 
Single Unemployed without Children -1.4 -22.3 3 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, at December 2015 incorporating for 2016 the main changes in 
direct tax, welfare, public service pay/pensions, water charges, the National Minimum Wage and the Early Childhood Care 
and Education (ECCE) Scheme. 
 
In respect of Budgets 2009-2016, losses are larger and more widespread and 
there are no gains. Single unemployed people without children have experienced 
by far the largest losses (more than 22 per cent): this reflects the cuts to 
jobseeker payments for the young unemployed in particular. Most family types 
saw losses of between 8 and 11 per cent. The contributing factors to the losses 
vary by income level. At the lowest income levels, reductions in welfare payment 
rates, property tax and water charges play significant roles. At the highest income 
levels, major contributory factors are income-related taxes (income tax and USC) 
and cuts in public sector pay. The lowest losses, of between 5 and 6 per cent, 
were experienced by retired tax units, both single and couples. This reflects the 
protection afforded to pension payments throughout crisis budgets. 
 
Conclusion 
Our analysis provides a nationally representative picture of the impact of the 
main tax and welfare changes in Budget 2016, taking into account the increase in 
the National Minimum Wage and the value (at cost of provision) of additional 
pre-schooling. The analysis is undertaken relative to a distributionally neutral 
budget, implemented via indexation of tax and welfare parameters in line with 
expected wage growth. 
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Compared with a wage-indexed benchmark, we find that Budget 2016 led to a 
modest increase – just under 0.7 per cent – in aggregate household disposable 
income (i.e. incomes including welfare payments and net of income tax, USC and 
PRSI). For the 20 per cent of households with the lowest incomes, on average 
Budget 2016 will have a similar impact to a neutral, wage-indexed budget. For 
most other income groups, changes in Budget 2016 will lead to gains of close to 
0.5 per cent up to 1 per cent, as compared with a neutral or wage-indexed 
budget. 
 
By contrast, budgets over the 2009 to 2016 period have given rise to substantial 
income losses at all income levels, as budget deficits were reduced. These may be 
termed ‘policy-induced losses’ to distinguish them from falls in income arising 
from unemployment, lower wages or falling self-employment incomes. For most 
income groups, these losses were between 7½ per cent and just over 10 per cent. 
The greatest policy-induced losses were for the top income group, at just over 14 
per cent, and the lowest income group, at 12¾ per cent. 
 
Analysis at family unit level reveals that the greatest losses imposed by Budgets 
2009 to 2016 were for single unemployed people, while the lowest losses were 
for pensioners. This reflects the substantial cuts in welfare payment rates for the 
young unemployed in particular, and the fact that pension payment rates, unlike 
working-age payment rates, were increased by Budgets 2009 and 2016.  
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Appendix 1    On the Need for a Distributionally Neutral Benchmark 
 
We noted that budgetary conventions governing the adjustment (or non-
adjustment) of tax and benefit parameters can vary across countries and over 
time. Experiences in the UK, the US and Ireland illustrate this point. Each of these 
countries experienced high inflation during the 1970s. At that point, the default 
option for each country was that basic income tax parameters remained 
unchanged (‘frozen’) in nominal terms unless explicitly changed. During this time, 
failures to adjust nominal values of income tax parameters in line with earnings 
growth led to increases in average tax rates as higher incomes moved more 
income into brackets taxed at higher rates – a phenomenon known as ‘fiscal drag’ 
or ‘bracket creep’.  
 
UK Experience 
In the UK, the system was amended by the 1977 Finance Act which made 
uprating of income tax allowances in line with the Retail Prices Index the new 
default option.17 Currently Pope et al. (2015) note that: 
Most bands and allowances are increased at the start (in April) of 
every tax year in line with statutory indexation provisions, unless 
Parliament intervenes. These increases are announced at the time of 
the annual Budget and are in line with the percentage increase in the 
consumer price index (CPI) in the year to the previous September. The 
additional-rate limit and the £100,000 threshold at which the 
personal allowance starts to be withdrawn are frozen in nominal 
terms each year unless Parliament intervenes. 
 
On the benefit side, Hood and Oakley (2014) summarise the situation as follows: 
Benefits and tax credits are usually uprated at the start of every 
financial year in line with prices. From 2011-2012, almost all benefits, 
tax credits and public service pensions have been indexed to the 
consumer prices index (CPI)..... An important exception to the CPI-
uprating of benefits is the ‘triple-lock’ guarantee for the state 
pension: since 2012-2013, it has been increased by the highest of 
earnings growth, CPI price inflation and 2.5 per cent. Thus, for 2014-
2015, the state pension increased by CPI inflation (2.7 per cent) – the 
highest of these benchmarks. 
 
                                                          
17   ‘An Act of Parliament is required in order to increase income tax allowances by less than the increase in RPI, which 
means that the default option is that they be uprated in line with RPI.’ Alt et al., 2012. 
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By default, pension credit rates are uprated in line with earnings 
growth, but in recent years they have seen the same cash increase as 
the basic state pension, which has been more generous than earnings 
indexation.  
The majority of benefits and tax credits for working-age people are to 
be increased by 1 per cent for three years from 2013-2014 (disability 
benefits and the disability elements of other benefits and tax credits 
such as child tax credit are excluded).  
 
Thus, UK experience includes the use of both price indexation and earnings 
indexation, and in more recent years a ‘triple lock’ involving the minimum of price 
inflation, earnings growth and a pre-specified fixed minimum rate. This 
mechanism would involve a ‘ratchet effect’ whereby pensions would rise faster 
than both prices and earnings in the medium to long run. This has been strongly 
criticised by Johnson (2015) who notes that: 
At some point it will prove to be prohibitively expensive; the Office for 
Budget Responsibility estimates that it will add well over one per cent 
of national income to pension spending by the middle of this century 
relative to the cost of earnings indexation. It also adds a bizarre 
degree of randomness into the future level of state pensions which 
will depend not on overall increases in prices or earnings but on the 
timing of those rises. 
 
The UK experience shows how the default policy has changed substantially over 
the years, with systems containing the following elements in operation at 
different times: 
• No automatic indexation, and all changes being regarded as discretionary; 
• Widespread indexation of taxes and benefits to the Retail Price Index; 
• Differential indexation of pension-related benefits and credits and working-
age payments, with pension-related benefits linked to earnings or to the 
minimum of earnings, prices and a fixed minimum rate of increase; 
• A shift from the use of the Retail Price Index to the Consumer Price Index. 
 
US Experience 
In the US, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA81), introduced 
indexation of individual income tax parameters which became effective in 1985 
(Bargain et al., 2014). Most US states also adopt some form of indexation. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov/dolfaq/bls_ques1.htm) notes that the 
Consumer Price Index is used to provide automatic adjustments of payments to 
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almost 50 million Social Security beneficiaries and 20 million food stamp 
recipients. 
 
Ireland 
There has been little by way of explicit and automatic indexation of the Irish 
income tax system along the lines seen in the UK and the US. Adjustment of the 
money value of most tax and welfare parameters has remained a matter for 
discretionary decisions within each budget. For a period, there was provision in 
the capital gains tax system for indexation of the costs of acquisition of capital 
assets, when calculating capital gains; these indexation provisions have, however, 
been abolished. One other area where the opening budget allowed for some 
adjustment of a nominal parameter was with respect to the former income 
ceiling on PRSI contributions. This tended to rise broadly in line with earnings, but 
as the limit has been abolished, this is no longer a feature. 
 
Official analyses of the distributional impact of Irish budgets have focused on 
impacts measured against a scenario in which tax and welfare parameters are 
frozen in nominal terms. The recent Social Impact Assessment of Budget 2015 
(Department of Social Protection, 2015) continues in this tradition, now using the 
SWITCH model to implement this framework. 
 
Implications 
Money-valued tax and welfare parameters may, by default, remain unchanged or 
be adjusted in line with a measure of price inflation or wage growth. Government 
choices on this issue vary across countries and over time. If the impact of policy is 
measured relative to the default policy chosen by government the outcomes are 
sensitive to government’s choice of the default policy. A standard which is 
independent of such government choices is desirable. The ‘distributionally 
neutral’ benchmark described in the text provides a measure of policy impact 
which is independent of government’s choice of default policy, and has a number 
of desirable features. It is macroeconomically neutral – average tax rates are 
constant from year to year – and it is distributionally neutral – average incomes 
rise by the same proportion at different income levels, so that income shares 
remain constant. 
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Appendix 2    Sensitivity of Results to Alternative Treatments of 
Minimum Wage and Public Sector Pay Changes 
 
In our preferred approach, we regarded the 2016 public sector pay adjustments 
as approximately equal to private sector wage growth, and therefore forming 
part of the baseline wage-indexed budget rather than a discretionary or special 
measure. It could be argued, however, that the nature of the public sector wage 
adjustments – close to a flat rate money amount from PRD, and explicit 
percentage increases only for the lowest pay scales – means that they should be 
examined as a distinct policy measure. In Figure A.1, we examine how these 
public sector pay changes would alter the picture provided earlier in Figure 1. 
 
Similarly, our preferred approach included the impact of an increase in the 
National Minimum Wage; while some would argue that as this is paid for by 
employers, it should not be included on a par with tax and welfare adjustments. 
Figure A.1 again helps to identify the impact of including or excluding the 
National Minimum Wage change in  the  modelling approach. 
 
Figure A.1 shows that the impact of the 50 cent increase in the hourly National 
Minimum Wage is quite limited in scale. As a result, analysis excluding the NMW 
impact would make little difference to the conclusions in the main text. It is 
noticeable that the NMW leads to small impacts spread quite widely across the 
household income distribution – the reasons for this are discussed in the main 
text. 
 
Figure A.1 shows that the public sector wage changes have a somewhat greater 
impact. However, these changes tend to lead to a greater divergence between 
income growth for middle and most upper income groups and the quintile of 
households with lowest incomes. The explicit shaping of public sector wage 
changes towards lower incomes is reflected in the limitation of such gains in the 
top decile, but does not result in a greater gain for those in the bottom quintile of 
the household income distribution.  
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FIGURE A.1 Impact of Budget 2016 – Percentage Change in Disposable Income by Income Decile Relative to 
Wage-Indexed Budget: Sensitivity Analysis to Alternative Treatments of Changes in the National 
Minimum Wage and Public Sector Pay 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, at December 2015 and including changes to USC, income tax and 
welfare measures specified in the text, along with the impact of changes in the National Minimum Wage and expansion of 
the Early Childhood Care and Education scheme, valued at the cost of provision. Each income group contains one-tenth of all 
households, ranked from lowest to highest incomes. Budgetary impacts are assessed relative to a neutral budget with tax 
bands, tax credits and welfare payments increased in line with expected wage growth of 2.35 per cent. 
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A Review of Housing Supply Policies 
Ciara Morley, David Duffy and Kieran McQuinn1  
Introduction  
The significant variation in house prices observed across many OECD countries 
has attracted much attention and resulted in a greater level of understanding of 
the demand side of housing markets. The international literature on house prices 
has, in light of the many housing booms and busts observed, increased 
substantially. However, less attention has been devoted to understanding the 
supply side of the housing market. Vermeulen and Rouwendal (2007) note that in 
spite of a growing recognition of the importance of supply conditions for the level 
and volatility of house prices and the demand for housing, empirical work on 
housing supply outside the US is still relatively scarce. To some extent this has 
been due to a lack of appropriate supply-side data. However in recent times this 
issue has become less of a problem. 
 
Gyourko (2009), amongst others, has highlighted the fact that a thorough 
understanding of not only demand but also supply is essential for understanding 
the workings of any market. Recent developments in housing markets 
internationally have led to a heightened interest in the supply side of housing 
markets.  
 
It is a stylized fact that the supply response, internationally, to demand-side 
factors such as income, interest rates, house prices and demographic pressures 
can vary substantially. There are many potential reasons or ‘frictions’ for the 
heterogeneity observed in supply. Given the importance of regulatory costs along 
with building costs as a key determinant of supply responsiveness, certain 
economies have attempted to overcome supply-side ‘frictions’ through 
government interventions. As outlined by Barker (2004) these interventions can 
include economic instruments, such as taxation, which influences choices by 
altering incentives in the housing market; regulation, which can determine the 
amount of housing that can be supplied, its location and nature; and finally 
subsidies, which take the form of the provision of social and affordable housing, 
which primarily address issues of equity. 
 
                                                          
1  Thanks to Alan Barrett for comments on a previous draft. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
This work has been funded by NAMA and the Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
76 | Qua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  Comme nt ary  –  Wi nt e r  2 015  
 
 
 
 
These interventions can and do lead to varying outcomes and so it is important 
that certain aspects of the housing market are considered before implementing 
such policies. For example, one needs to determine and understand the causes of 
under-supply of residential housing in the economy. If it is related to issues of 
land availability then interventions such as land or property taxes may be most 
appropriate. In Denmark for example land taxes have been introduced which 
increase in line with land prices which generally results in land becoming 
available when most needed. A recent OECD report2 identified the flip-side to 
lagging housing supply however. It noted that in countries with relatively flexible 
supply, housing investment adjusts more rapidly to large changes in demand and 
this contributes to more cyclical swings in economic growth, as witnessed in 
recent developments. 
 
While there has been a significant body of research devoted to analysis of Irish 
house price movements, there has been only a handful of studies examining the 
supply side of the Irish market. Kenny (1998), for example, in noting that Irish 
housing supply is very inelastic in the short-run, also re-examines the relatively 
high cost of supply, the durability of supply, and its heterogeneity. These issues 
were initially highlighted in a previous study by Quigley (1992). Smith et al. (1988) 
also examine the extensive involvement of government as a significant cause of 
inelasticity in the Irish case.  
 
Therefore, it appears especially opportune at this stage of Ireland’s economic 
recovery to assess our current understanding of the supply side of the housing 
market. In particular, the purpose of this review is to provide insight into the 
types of cross-country interventions aimed at stimulating housing supply and 
assess the implications of this for the Irish market. The rest of this paper is laid 
out as follows; in the next section we review cross-country estimates of housing 
supply elasticities, this is followed by a review of taxation and incentives, with 
subsequent sections addressing the role played by infrastructure, access to 
development finance and planning regulations. A final section offers some 
concluding comments. 
 
Supply Elasticity  
Across all aspects of the housing supply literature, the issue of supply 
responsiveness or elasticity is emphasised. Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001) shed 
 
                                                          
2  Andrews, D., A. Caldera Sanchez and A. Johansson (2011). ‘Housing and the economy: policies for renovation’, 
Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth.  
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light on the fact that most housing models, and most policy analyses, hinge on 
explicit or implicit estimates of the price elasticity of supply of housing.  
 
In an earlier contribution, Quigley (1979) highlights the real analytical difficulties 
for modelling supply. Unlike other markets where one observes price per 
standard unit, in the housing market, housing expenditure is observed. There is 
however no standard housing quantity since each unit can vary considerably on 
many quality dimensions. Similarly, it is difficult to ascertain supply based on 
type, as for example one large house may be re-developed into several smaller 
apartments. In order to understand the micro foundations of housing supply, 
Quigley (1979) asserts that several key pieces of information are required such as 
the quality and quantity of housing services offered by the supplier as well as 
maintenance and capital improvement decisions, rents, and asset values.  
 
It is therefore important, when introducing regulations and policies dealing with 
supply, to understand how the market, in terms of housing supply and house 
prices, responds to demand-side shocks. 
 
It is well documented that the United Kingdom housing market is extremely 
unresponsive to any changes in price. In terms of elasticities, Barker (2003, 2004) 
notes that UK house building is only half as responsive as the French, a third as 
responsive as the US and only a quarter as responsive as German house building. 
Swank et al. (2003) derived similar estimates in their analysis (see Table 1). Barker 
(2003, 2004) does, however, observe that international comparisons of supply 
elasticities need to be treated carefully because of structural differences in the 
way the house building industry operates.  
 
Ball et al. (2011) comment further on the observation made by Barker (2003, 
2004) and claim that differences in supply elasticities occur because of 
differences in measurement. Numerous models in the literature concentrate on 
the responsiveness of housing supply to the level of house prices while others 
concentrate on the response to the change in prices. Uniformly in the literature, 
the price elasticity of supply with respect to changes is much higher than with 
respect to levels. They highlight that international estimates can be found that 
range from approximately zero to infinity, but this is clearly not helpful for policy.  
 
Despite differences in the methodologies used to calculate elasticities there does 
appear to be an emerging consensus on the main variables that affect housing 
supply and new construction. These include house prices; construction costs; 
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credit costs and availability; topology; land use regulation, uncertainty and impact 
fees.3  
 
In relation to boom-bust cycles, Pryce (1999) estimates that the elasticity of 
supply of housing during booms (0.58) is smaller than during slumps (1.03) in the 
UK market. He also estimates the supply of land to be more stable over the cycle 
and marginally greater (0.75) during booms than during slumps (0.71). This 
means that housebuilders can be more responsive when prices are falling 
(through cuts in housebuilding levels), than when prices are rising (through 
increased activity). This is partly because of the long time-lags that are needed to 
increase the amount of land – the main factor of production. 
 
TABLE 1  INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF PRICE ELASTICITY OF THE SUPPLY OF NEW HOUSING 
Country Supply Elasticity 
Germany 2.05 
United States 1.40 
France 1.09 
Denmark 0.66 
United Kingdom 0.45 
Netherlands 0.30 
 
Source:  Swank, J., J. Kakes and A. Tieman (2003). ‘The housing ladder, taxation, and borrowing constraints’. Research Memorandum 
0209.  
Note:  Time periods over which the estimates are made are: UK: 1976-1999; Germany: 1976-1999; France: 1981-1998; Netherlands: 
1976-1998; Denmark: 1980-1999; US: 1970-1999. 
 
Analysis of the supply side of the market including the elasticity of supply is still 
relatively limited outside of the US and the UK. However we do know, from OECD 
estimates,4 that in both North America and certain Nordic countries the long-run 
price responsiveness of new housing is quite strong. This compares to continental 
European countries where the relationship is much weaker. Swank et al. (2003) 
provide an international comparison of price elasticity of the supply of new 
housing (see Table 1). While caution is warranted in terms of comparisons it is 
interesting to note the substantial gap between Germany with elasticity greater 
than unity and that recorded for Netherlands. Differences in mortgage interest 
deductions, as highlighted by the authors, may go some way to explaining the 
different elasticities in the Netherlands and the UK and Denmark.  
 
 
                                                          
3  An impact fee is a fee that is imposed by a local government within the United States on a new or proposed 
development project to pay for all or a portion of the costs of providing public services to the new development. In 
Ireland impact fees are equivalent to development fees. 
4  Andrews, D., A. Caldera Sánchez and Å. Johansson (2011). ‘Housing and the economy: policies for renovation’, OECD 
Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth. 
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Taxation and Incentives 
There have been a number of reports on the tax incentives, such as the Urban-, 
Town- and Rural-Renewal schemes, introduced in the early nineties to incentivise 
construction in the Irish Economy. While helpful in contributing to significant 
economic regeneration, it is generally accepted that many of the incentives 
introduced in this period were extended to such an extent that any benefit 
generated was outweighed by the associated costs. 
 
Williams and Boyle (2012) draw on research that confirms that selective tax 
waivers and other incentives for developers, investors and residents can play a 
significant role in improving the physical and economic environment in cities. In 
the analysis of property market failures in Dublin, Williams and Boyle (2012) focus 
on the role of property tax incentives in urban regeneration and provide an 
overview of the benefits, costs and impacts of the incentives from an urban 
development market perspective. The research shows that property-based tax 
incentives were, in the period 1986-2011, initially successful in achieving physical 
development objectives. The research also highlights critical issues that arose in 
the latter years of the period. Most notable is the fact that successive 
governments failed to terminate interventions once market development activity 
recovered.  
 
Both Indecon (2005) and Goodbody (2005) review the various policies introduced 
to stimulate construction in the lead up to the housing boom. Indecon (2005), on 
behalf of the Department of Finance, preformed a major review of tax incentives 
in place in 2005. The report provides a positive assessment of many of the 
schemes. For example, in discussing capital allowances for hotels and holiday 
camps, they noted that  
the existence of the tax incentive (had) improved both the quality and 
quantity of supply and the levels of investment experiences since 
1997 would not have occurred in the absence of the incentive.  
 
However, they expressed a clear view that many of the schemes were no longer 
needed by 2005 and that their continuation could have negative consequences 
and in particular would constitute a deadweight which was becoming evident in 
the property-related reliefs.  
 
Central to the report’s findings were the recommendations that the decision to 
introduce any new incentives should be informed by a formal assessment of the 
likely costs and benefits. In conjunction with this, any tax incentive schemes 
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which are introduced should have a defined lifespan of a maximum of three years 
and extensions should only be considered after evaluation of the results of a 
formal cost-benefit appraisal. 
 
Goodbody (2005) on the other hand reviewed area-based schemes as part of a 
broader review of tax reliefs. With respect to the Urban Renewal Scheme they 
comment that ‘the scheme has had very positive effects on dereliction’ and also 
that it has ‘enhanced housing output in the target areas’. Like Indecon (2005), 
Goodbody (2005) expressed a view that the need for such schemes had passed by 
2005.  
 
Goodbody (2005) also note that the tax benefits of the Urban Renewal Scheme 
had accrued to a relatively small number of high-income earners and so ran 
counter to policy objectives on income distribution. They also note that the 
scheme had led to inflation in property prices. This point on the impact of 
property-related tax reliefs on property prices was taken up by Regling and 
Watson (2010) who argue that these tax reliefs contributed to the property 
bubble of the 2000s. They also argue that extension of tax reliefs (property-
related and others) added to the erosion of the tax base which was so 
problematic when the crash of 2008 occurred. 
 
The examination of the various schemes introduced prior to the housing boom 
indicates that while the schemes appear, for the most part, to have been initially 
beneficial for the economy, the issues lay in the fact that many schemes were 
extended several times over without adequate cost-benefit analyses being 
conducted.  
 
The Urban Regeneration and Housing Act 2015 was signed into law in Ireland in 
2015 and has become widely known as the ‘use it or lose it’ act. The Act has been 
introduced as part of the Construction 2020 Initiative and focuses primarily on 
the vacant site levy and revisions to planning development contribution and the 
social housing provision. Both Property Industry Ireland (PII) and the Society of 
Chartered Surveys Ireland (SCSI) published reports in 2014/2015, focused on the 
issues in the Irish planning system which they believe may cause or are currently 
causing the biggest impediment to housing supply in the country. The vacant site 
tax is one aspect quite similar to that recommended below, in Hüfner and 
Lundsgaard (2007), to make available unused land. 
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The report from the SCSI agrees with the vacant site tax in principle but it 
maintains a level of concern regarding its timing and suitability in the current 
market. The report notes that it may not always be economically viable to build 
on sites around the country, particularly in regions outside of urban areas where 
there may not be a demand for housing. 
 
Sweden has a housing supply problem insofar as developments are not generally 
located where the greatest demand arises. In order to tackle the challenges in 
Sweden, Hüfner and Lundsgaard (2007) propose a system similar to that 
introduced in Denmark which deals with the issue of incentives. Barker (2004) 
details this locally levied land value tax which increases in line with land prices 
and thus rises as development pressure grows. This provides landowners with a 
direct financial incentive to release suitable land for development when the 
market demands it most. Muellbauer (2005) argues that a similar system in the 
UK would generate efficiency and stabilisation gains for the economy as a whole 
and improve the functioning of the land use planning system. 
 
Land and property taxation across Europe varies substantially. Policy Exchange 
(2013) reports, in detail, the taxation choices of the UK and compares it to other 
OECD countries. It concludes that all countries tax property and land through a 
mixture of capital gains, inheritance and small annual levies on the value of 
property. Interestingly, they highlight the fact that a reasonably modest 
proportional taxation of property has not had the impact previously thought. For 
example, despite high levels of taxation, countries such as the US, UK and 
Australia have experienced very volatile housing markets. In recent years the UK 
has taken steps to encourage supply in the housing market by making low valued 
properties, new and existing, temporarily exempt from stamp duty. Meullbauer 
(2005) claims that both stamp duty and capital gains tax are relatively poor forms 
of property taxation, with new housing in the UK amounting annually to just 1 per 
cent of housing supply. 
 
The level of revenue raised from property taxes in Germany has been low for 
several years; property tax share of GDP was 0.9 per cent in 2011. The German 
system of taxing property varies in terms of the valuation date used to generate 
the notional value and the actual tax rates. In many cases the values are based on 
valuations as far back as 1935. This means that rates in these particular areas 
range from 5-10 per cent compared to rates of 0.26-0.35 per cent in other areas. 
It is worth noting that the growth in housing supply in Germany has been the 
result of flexible planning systems and the tight control of the money supply by 
the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank post-1999. 
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While comparisons in housing supply are drawn between Ireland, the UK, US and 
Europe it is worth noting at this stage that market conditions vary considerably 
across countries. The UK and the US, as well as Ireland, experienced quite rapid 
growth in credit supply in the late 1990s which fuelled the demand for housing 
and subsequent housing boom. Credit conditions in many European countries 
and in particular Germany were much more constrained as outlined above. 
Additionally demographic aspects vary quite substantially across markets. A 
younger demographic in countries like Ireland and the UK will result in greater 
household formation in the coming years and thus a greater need for appropriate 
levels of housing supply. 
 
A report from the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) in 2004 outlines 
the experience in the US where extensive use of land value taxation was used in 
Pittsburgh in particular. The city restructured its property taxes so that land was 
taxed at approximately five times the rate of structures. It was believed that land 
value taxes, unlike taxes on labour and business, did not inhibit activity. Research 
(Oates and Schwab (1997) suggests that such taxes and the approach taken 
above may act to inflate any property bubbles that may develop. Pittsburgh has 
since moved to a conventional property tax. 
 
In terms of subsidies available to the market, DiPasquale (1997) concludes that 
subsidising developers to produce rental housing for moderate-income 
households tends to displace private construction and as a result generates no 
increase in the housing stock. The fundamental concern is the extent to which 
these production programmes increase the size of the rental housing stock or 
simply displace private new construction. This follows analysis from Murray 
(1983) which analysed the impact of public housing on housing supply and found 
that public housing increases the housing stock; three-quarters of public housing 
units represented additions to the stock while one-quarter displaced private 
construction.  
 
Williams and Boyle (2012) provide important conclusions in their analysis of the 
tax incentives introduced in Ireland in the period 1986 to 2011. They recommend 
that greater care must be taken with regard to the power afforded to vested 
interests that vigorously advocate for and benefit from interventions remaining in 
place long after they are required. This falls in line with the recommendations 
made in the SCSI report of better cost-benefit analysis prior to the introduction, 
and during the lifetime, of any tax incentive. 
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Infrastructure and Access to Development Finance 
Although Mayer and Somerville (2000b) determine that development fees have a 
relatively small impact on new construction they do find that regulations which 
lengthen the development process can have significant effects. It is therefore 
important that governments make appropriate and deliberate decisions when 
choosing what regulations and levies should be introduced to increase housing 
supply. 
 
A recent report from the SCSI (2015) concluded that despite reductions across 
the four local authorities, development contributions are still a major obstacle to 
development. It notes that compared to the SCSI Construction Tender Price 
Index, which is currently approximately one-third lower than at the peak, 
development contributions have yet to to fall by the same amount. Similar to the 
UK experience the requirement to fund infrastructure in advance of the 
development being completed is considered one of the main reasons for the 
delay in new housing coming on the market. The UK have introduced a number of 
schemes to help finance almost finished developments.  
 
In the UK the Department for Community and Local Government (DCLG) and the 
Homes and Communities Agency, for example, have introduced a £525 million 
Builders’ Finance Fund to help reignite and boost housing developments of 
between 15 and 250 units. One of the main objectives of this plan is to help finish 
stalled but viable sites as well as accelerating fundamentally viable housing 
schemes. The Fund was introduced in early 2014 and is due to deliver 
approximately 13,000 new homes in total. 
 
On a greater scale a £1 billion Large Site Infrastructure Fund has been introduced 
to bring forward larger scale housing projects. This involves a program of support 
over a six-year period designed to address barriers and help accelerate and 
unlock housing developments of at least 1,500 housing units that have slowed 
down or stalled completely. In total it is envisioned that upwards of 200,000 new 
homes will become available over the six-year period due to this fund. 
 
Another policy innovation introduced in the UK, the Revolving Infrastructure Fund 
(RIF), acts as a funding mechanism for infrastructure in advance of developments 
being completed. This is an issue in many countries with local authorities in 
Germany and Sweden (Hüfner and Lundsgaard (2007) for example slow to 
sanction land release for owner occupation, due to the large infrastructure costs 
associated with such expansions. The RIF in the UK aims to increase housing 
growth by delivering on the infrastructure required to unlock potential 
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developments. The fund comprises two elements, an investment phase which 
provides cash to pay for the key items of physical infrastructure and a repayment 
phase with receipts coming back to the RIF. Once the RIF has generated sufficient 
receipts it is then able to reinvest in other projects and so is neither a grant nor a 
subsidy. 
 
In spite of the financial support the UK government is offering through loans and 
guarantees in excess of £10 billion, housing supply is still seriously lagging behind 
what is required. Measures included in the government strategy ‘Laying the 
Foundations’, such as the New Homes Bonus and the stimulus packages, which 
were augmented in the Budget for 2014, have so far had little impact on new 
housing supply. 
 
In 2013 the National Audit Office completed a report on the New Homes Bonus, 
assessing whether the DCLG was meeting its objectives of incentivising local 
authorities to encourage the development of more homes. In general the report 
concluded that the estimates provided by the DCLG were ‘unreliable’. In the 
report they note that the Department estimated that the Bonus would increase 
housing supply by 8 to 13 per cent over its first ten years, equivalent to around 
140,000 additional homes. However significant technical issues with the DCLG 
methodology were noted by the National Audit Office which, it is anticipated, will 
further hamper housing supply in the UK market. 
 
In Ireland, the recent Construction 2020 report (2015) from the Department of 
Finance touched on the difficulties encountered by smaller construction firms in 
raising finance. One of the key findings of an initial report which assessed the 
availability of senior debt financing was that up to 65 per cent of development 
costs (on viable projects) are provided by banks. The issue then arises of how 
firms, in particular smaller firms, finance the remaining 35 per cent of the cost 
required. Construction 2020 highlights the fact that firms may not be large 
enough or sophisticated enough to attract investment from larger private equity 
investors. 
 
In an attempt to boost such viable projects, the NAMA Residential Funding 
Programme 2016-2020 was established with the objective of delivering 20,000 
housing units in total by the end of 2020. While specific details are not currently 
widely available it is anticipated that €4.5 billion will be allocated to the 
programme. The NTMA also established the Ireland Strategic Investment Fund 
(ISIF) which will see €7.4 billion invested across industry sectors, regions and 
asset classes. A proportion of this funding will be allocated to financing 
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infrastructure which may go some way to making commercially marginal sites 
viable for development. 
 
From a US point of view, impact fees, similar to development contributions in 
Ireland, are defined as local charges imposed on developers to finance the 
provision of infrastructure. The results from Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006), based 
on a unique panel of impact fees and home completions for Florida counties, 
strongly contradict conventional wisdom regarding the negative effects of impact 
fees on housing construction. They find, for example, that the introduction of 
impact fees actually increases the number of completions of all sizes of homes 
within inner suburban areas and medium-sized and large homes within outer 
suburban areas. In providing some explanation for this result they hypothesise 
that in addition to increasing the total fees that the developer must pay, impact 
fees also act to increase the demand for housing, reduce project approval costs 
and increase the percentage of projects that receive approval from local 
authorities. 
 
This study follows previous work that has found somewhat contradictory results. 
Bruekner (1997) for example notes that, compared to other ways of financing 
infrastructure, while impact fees reduce the amount of residential development, 
the predicted effect on land values are ambiguous. On the empirical side, 
Skidmore and Peddle (1998) amongst others find that residential development in 
many areas of the US fell substantially after the imposition of such impact fees. 
While the literature remains inconclusive with regard to the effect of impact fees, 
McFarlane (1999) points out that the way the fee is structured, for example 
whether it is on land, on housing, or on the value of the developed land, matters 
for these predicted effects.  
 
Planning Regulations 
Much comment recently has focussed on the need to undergo reform of building 
regulations in order to increase supply. Certain aspects of building standards and 
regulatory requirements have received much more attention than others and it is 
possible that some reform to these particular aspects, discussed in more detail 
below, will provide some level of stimulation to the housing supply issue in 
Ireland. 
 
The Department of Environment, Community and Local Government Housing 
Policy Statement (2011) sets out as the overall strategic objective for the housing 
sector ‘to enable all households access good quality housing appropriate to 
household circumstances and in their particular community of choice’. 
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Government regulation and policy interventions will aim to ensure that the 
housing market makes an appropriate contribution to wider economic 
performance.  
 
More recently, in May 2014, strategy regarding the construction sector has been 
set out in the Construction 2020 initiative. The strategy aims to address issues 
affecting the construction and housing markets including: 
• A strategic approach to the provision of housing; 
• Continued improvement of the planning process; 
• The availability of financing for viable and worthwhile projects; 
• Tools to monitor and regulate the sector; and 
• Ensuring a fit for purpose sector. 
 
A recent Spotlight (2014) report provides a comprehensive overview of many 
areas of the planning system in Ireland and how some aspects may hinder supply 
within the market. As well as issues regarding the staffing levels at An Bord 
Pleanála, which Spotlight (2014) claims is impacting the speed at which 
applications could be dealt with, the report also addresses the lack of planning 
compliance regulation which is having a direct impact on housing supply. 
Currently there is no statutory timeframe for the planning authority to make a 
decision on compliance submissions made by an applicant. The report goes on to 
state that ‘this can lead to a delay in the progression of developments, lack of 
clarity for developers, and in some cases non-compliant developments’. The 
provision of a statutory timeline in the Planning Regulations regarding 
compliance may help to prevent extended delays in the commencement of 
developments. 
 
A second strand of the Urban Regeneration and Housing Act, 2015 focuses on 
Part V of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 (commonly known as ‘Part V’). 
Under this new Housing Act, developers will now be required to reserve up to 10 
per cent of a housing development – on developments of nine or more houses – 
for social housing. This compares to a requirement of 20 per cent in the previous 
2000 Act. It is anticipated that this reform will boost housing development and 
ease the existing housing shortage. The SCSI believes that this expectation is 
somewhat simplistic. Their 2015 report highlights the many issues, such as 
development contribution, infrastructure requirements and access to funding, 
which the SCSI believe, collectively, are restricting supply. Reform to Part V alone 
will do little to kick-start construction of residential housing. 
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The Spotlight (2014) report provides some insight into the inefficiencies of Part V 
in recent years. It notes that in the period from 2002 to 2011, Part V has 
delivered 19,245 social housing units. At 4.8 per cent of all housing units 
delivered in this period, it is far below the anticipated 15 per cent set out in the 
Planning and Development Act 2000. While the report indicates that Part V has 
provided a net benefit to the Exchequer a further report from PII (2014) suggests 
that very little revenue will be generated from the tax in the coming years due to 
the fact that new developments are likely to be much smaller in comparison to 
those completed in the recent past. 
 
The 2004 report from the NESC provides an overview of the guidelines set out by 
the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitutions (APOCC) which suggests 
that mechanisms should be put in place to control the price of development land 
coming to the market. Active land management, primarily used to develop social 
housing, has been a long tradition in Sweden. This Swedish system of land 
intervention is associated with a distinctive pattern of housing provision with the 
non-profit sector (public and private) responsible for over 50 per cent of new 
completions. When comparing the housing market in high-growth regions of 
Sweden, Britain and France, NESC (2004) found that Sweden has the highest level 
of productive efficiency and the lowest level of uncertainty for builders. Similarly 
in the Netherlands there was a long practice, for many decades, of local 
authorities dominating the development of land for new construction of social 
housing.  
 
The housing issues that have arisen in Sweden in the past number of years have 
been linked to the fact that the current supply of private housing is not located 
where demand requires. One challenge therefore, as outlined by Hüfner and 
Lundsgaard (2007), is to better match supply with demand. An adequate supply 
response to growing demand is further hampered by a planning system that lacks 
incentives and a construction sector with one of the highest costs in Europe due 
to weak competition. The issue of cumbersome planning regulations and few 
incentives for municipalities to issue more land has also been noted as a problem 
in the Swedish market. 
 
In addition, Konkurrensverket (2006) outlines the numerous problems with the 
planning process in Sweden in some detail. It is noted that municipalities play an 
essential role in the building process. Prior to granting a building license, a 
municipality must set up a general plan (designating residential, commercial and 
industrial areas) and a detailed plan (defining the type of building). The process of 
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developing or changing a detailed plan can be long and tedious. In addition, 
appealing against detailed building plans can take up to three and a half years 
and thus makes a swift supply response to changes in demand quite difficult 
(McKinsey, 2006). Similarly, there is a severe lack of supply in economically 
developed regions of the US which is further constrained by the amount of land 
on which housebuilding is permitted and the time it takes – usually years – for 
developments to be processed through local planning (Policy Exchange (2013). 
 
Sen (1986) noted that the approval process for land conversion and subdivision 
can take two to seven years and is fraught with uncertainty. In most states, from 
15 to 20 separate government departments were involved in the approval of 
plans and specifications, adding another two to five years to project completion. 
A simple test of how well the housing market works in the aggregate is whether 
increases in effective demand are translated into increases in supply of housing 
or increase in the price of housing. 
 
The vast majority of the literature on land-use regulation concludes that land 
regulations act to restrict the supply of housing and new construction. Much of 
the literature in this area however is focused on the United States. Ihlanfeldt 
(2007) for example, looks at the effects of restrictiveness on more than a hundred 
Florida cities and finds that greater regulation raises house prices while Glaeser 
and Gyourko (2005) find that, in unregulated cities, house prices are close to 
construction costs but in heavily controlled areas prices are well above these 
costs.  
 
Quigley and Raphael (2005) find that the responsiveness of the housing stock via 
new construction is weaker in more regulated cities, relative to less regulated 
cities. Moreover, the difference in responsiveness is greatest for the supply of 
multi-family housing units, the source of supply that is most frequently the target 
of regulation. Glaeser et al. (2008) and Goodman and Thibodeau (2008) both find 
that price bubbles are more prevalent where the price elasticity of supply is low, 
while Mayer and Somerville (2000b) find that across 44 US metropolitan areas 
between 1985 and 1996, excessive land-use regulation could lower construction 
by up to 45 per cent. They also find that planning delays, through land-use and 
planning regulations are more important to developers than impact fees. 
 
Mayer and Somerville (2000a) characterise regulations as adding explicit costs, 
uncertainty or delays to the development process and note that theory indicates 
that regulations such as zoning, growth controls, and development fees affect 
housing market outcomes both by constraining supply and increasing demand. 
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Nearly all of the existing empirical work has explored the impact of regulation on 
house prices with the bulk of the papers finding that increased local regulation 
leads to higher house prices. To date it appears that the nearly exclusive focus on 
prices is problematic because difficulties then arise in determining whether 
higher price increases are due to higher demand or lower supply. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, Gyourko and Molloy (2014) find that regulation in the US 
appears to be the single most important influence on the supply of homes while 
labour and material costs do not appear to serve as a primary constraint on 
residential development. Looking at house prices and construction costs over the 
past 30 years they conclude that the growing wedge between the two illustrates 
that the price of land has been trending upward over time. They also note that 
research on this topic has been hampered by a lack of direct evidence on 
regulation. For example, it is exceptionally difficult to collect accurate data on the 
wide variety of regulation in place, as well as the problems associated when 
trying to compare the stringency of one type of regulation with another. 
Empirically, Malpezzi (1996) finds, in a study of 56 metropolitan areas in the US, 
increasing the level of regulation from its average by one standard deviation is 
associated with 22 per cent higher house prices and 11 per cent lower levels of 
construction.   
 
Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) analyse the market in Malaysia and note that relative 
to the US, the public sector has a considerable presence in the housing market. 
During the 1980s the public sector was responsible for 20-35 per cent of all new 
units constructed. They highlight five key interventions which have influenced the 
housing price level either directly, by increasing construction standards and costs, 
or indirectly, by increasing developers’ risk. Some of these interventions include 
the increasing role of the public sector in housing production, land use and 
infrastructures standards, and lengthy housing construction approval procedures. 
 
The Special Low Cost Housing Program (SLCHP) for example was undertaken in 
1986 in response to the cyclical downturn in Malaysia’s economy and in the 
construction industry in particular. It had two objectives: to increase the supply of 
low- and moderate-income housing, and to stimulate the economy through 
linkage effects. The main supply-side incentives in the programme were reduced 
infrastructure standards and speedier approval for land conversions and other 
regulatory matters.  
 
The most serious problem with implementing the SLCHP included lack of demand 
due to inappropriate pricing, poor choice of location and designs by developers, 
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and administrative constraints. The desire to reduce costs by choosing location 
with cheap land prices frequently led to producing houses far from existing 
employment and services, and which, as a result, sold slowly. The analysis also 
notes the lengthy process that developers must follow to secure approval of 
housing projects.  
 
Conclusion  
This examination of the existing international and domestic housing policies 
highlights a myriad of governmental approaches used to tackle the issue of 
housing supply and potential lack thereof. It is true that in some circumstances 
the lag in new residential construction is linked to non-policy constraints such as 
geographical conditions. However, in many circumstances, as the literature 
identifies, government policy plays a strong role in housing supply 
responsiveness.  
 
This paper highlights some of the main aspects of government policy that act to 
influence housing supply. In particular, three policies emerge that appear to play 
an important role in acting as a constraint on housing supply. International 
evidence shows that strict planning regulations can have a greater impact on 
housing development than infrastructural costs. Andrews et al. (2011), for 
example, identify lower supply elasticities in countries with strict land-use and 
planning regulations. This is considered to be especially the case in countries 
where it takes a relatively long period of time to acquire a building permit.  
 
Substantial infrastructural costs also play an important role in either intensifying 
or alleviating supply issues. As the recent report from SCSI (2015) established, 
development contributions are still a major obstacle to development in Ireland 
despite reductions across the four main local authorities. Evidence from the UK 
indicates that government grants used to subsidise stalled developments may 
provide some assistance in alleviating supply-side pressures. However, these 
schemes can be challenging to implement effectively and the success of such 
schemes is notoriously difficult to quantify.  
 
Finally, the study also finds that inappropriate taxation can result in serious 
consequences when it comes to residential construction. Several reports in the 
mid-2000s investigated the taxation policy mix in Ireland in the lead up to the 
housing construction boom. Indecon (2005) in particular recommended that the 
introduction of any new incentives should be informed by a formal assessment of 
the likely cost-benefit appraisal. Evidence from countries such as Denmark show 
that the introduction of a land tax that increases in line with house/land prices is 
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shown to act as an incentive to sell/use underdeveloped or vacant land in periods 
of increased demand. 
 
There remains much scope, from an Irish point of view in particular, for 
government policy reform to encourage new housing developments that will 
meet demand. A recent study from Duffy et al. (2014), based on likely future 
demographic trends, concludes that 25,000 housing units per annum are required 
over the next 15 years to meet the underlying demand in the Irish market. As it 
stands, Ireland is in a similar situation to the UK with completions well under half 
of what is required annually. Therefore, bridging the gap between the actual and 
desired housing stock, in an efficient and timely manner, requires a careful and 
prudent policy mix. 
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